Ranger One, et al; many posts reflect hindsight bias, particular when attempting to rethink ‘what’ happened, and then concluding ‘why’, choose an inappropriate response – cause and effect are not reversible in complex accidents.
Instead of looking for ‘cause’, think about what could be learnt from what has already been published; consider how this might relate to other situations, other people, yourself – airmanship, professionalism.
‘Blame and train’ is not a solution. It is impossible to be sure (‘
NEVER EVER’) that the required human behaviour – via training – will be applied in all situations. The surprise in many posts ‘how could the human have done this’, is no more than the same surprise which the accident crew encountered – surprise clouds our thoughts and adds mental workload, which the report considered.
If we wish to judge that more effective training is required then the focus could be on avoidance and situation awareness vice actions after the event – proactive not reactive safety.
Pprune is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety; everyone is
entitled to an opinion, but without justification then
we may not be entitled to an opinion; justification requires well-reasoned argument.
I have no strong views on what happened in this accident, but from some previous posts I will now consider where the seat is positioned during cruise – can the controls be reached and moved to the maximum deflection, and if I leave the seat to switch something, reconsider “should I be doing this”, and in addition to continually noting the pitch power values in flight, check the normal range of trim settings for each situation.
In the Cartoon below, change the Flt No as required.
“You are not entitled to your opinion. You are entitled to your informed opinion. No one is entitled to be ignorant.” Harland Ellison
