Dare we move back to the F-35?
In the next few years we are adopting an aircraft that will form the backbone of western airpower. Even without the cost and fleet size debate the aircraft remains controversial as the core aircraft has a lower performance than any contemporary aircraft. It does not accelerate particularly well, shoots its missiles from a much shorter range, has relatively poor agility, bleeds energy rather quickly and (when utilising its USP) does not carry much.
The USP of stealth remains the prime selling feature (avionics and sensor fusion can be developed on any aircraft). Optimised (or limited by physics and size) to reduce its radar signature in a limited cluster of frequencies, only time will tell how long this will provide an advantage. Radars operating outside of the optimised band will already have the ability to track the aircraft, perhaps at a reduced range, leaving only the targeting puzzle to be solved by modified RF techniques, data links, EO and IR.
Everyone appears to accept that without effective low-observable characteristics the core aircraft would not be a particularly capable platform. So just how long do we have left on the low-observable clock and its relentless ticking?