No one issue ‘caused’ this accident; the circumstances represent an emergent event associated with many (relatively insignificant) aspects coming together at a particular time. A much wider view is required of the potential inputs in order to gain an understanding, amongst which we have to accept that we may never be able to understand specific human contributions.
IMHO all of us posting in this forum should heed the advice of Richard Feynman; write down all of the things that we don’t know ….
The more astute would argue that if we don’t know then how can anything be written, yet the majority of our posts do just that, we expound the unknown based on assumption.
Thus what we should write down are all of the assumptions.
The need for AoA indication assumes that it will be used – seen, comprehended; yet the initial aircraft motion was in roll within the normal value of AoA. Subsequently, even if an excessive AoA was understood, was there sufficient control technique or ‘power’ available; technique could relate to situational understanding and training. Control power could relate to trim position. A complicated logic question posted yesterday asked if there is a difference in autotrim (follow up) with a ‘computed’ law change over and that forced by an electrical interruption.
The need for coupled sticks assumes that this will add to the understanding of what the aircraft is doing. Sidesticks coupled or not, FBW or mechanical, do not always have a direct relationship with the aircraft motion, particularly in upset situations. Asking what the other pilot is doing in manual flight is like asking what the autopilot is doing; it reflects the weakness of situation awareness or disparity in the alternative situations as perceived by the questioner. First look at what the aircraft is doing – then consider what has to be done, what is required, and how to achieve this; avoid the historical of ‘what are you doing’; think to the future.
Over 90% of mental activity involves understanding the situation, comprehending what is sensed. We might benefit from simplifying aspects of understanding – avoid asking how can something be done, but ask 'should we' be doing this.
Should repetitive maintenance action involve resetting a computer; is the reason for this choice of action understood (management and/or maintenance).
If a pilot has to leave the seat to make a selection, consider should this be done. ‘Should I’ ought to be one of those mental shortcuts which are formed by experience, but his depends on how we use what we think we know or don’t know, or that 'something' we just assume to be so.
Many (most) recent LoC accidents involved the absence of ‘protections’ or repetitive ‘maintenance’. A wide view of this would include lack of takeoff config warning (MD 80 maint), rad alt glitches (B 737 regulatory), AoA icing (A 320 maint and regulatory), pitot ice crystals (A330 regulatory), AT protection (MD11 regulatory); all these factors had been identified previously (they were known), yet were not ‘known’ to be a sufficient in isolation to be hazardous, i.e. an assumption that they would not ‘cause’ an accident.