Chimbu Warrior, I think your observations are generally spot on. Just to pick you up on one point.
Chimbu Said:
I grew up learning that circuit breakers were/are designed ONLY for circuit protection, and that they should NEVER be used as a reset tool or a switch. Modern practice seems to be completely the opposite.
That's a bit of a misunderstanding, while I imagine that you've probably got the idea of permissible Airbus computer resets, perhaps I can clarify.
The QRH directs pilots very specifically toward what items can be reset while airborne and while on the ground, for which purpose and which items cannot be.
The QRH specifically states:
In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table, or to those in the applicable TDU's (Temporary Document Units) or OEBs (Operational Engineering Bulletins). Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.
The "as a general rule" perhaps is misunderstood as a get out of jail card, I might suggest that this event didn't really meet the threshold for such an exception particularly given that the Caution could have been cancelled (emerg. cancel pushbutton), at least at that point. The problem may have deteriorated and required the exception to be invoked however I think you are right that the crew perhaps implied that the engineer had given permission.
My own outfit has come afoul of this process in the past, thankfully with no safety consequences and we have learnt as a result. In that case engineering were also contacted and this was perceived to be reason to not follow the QRH. That has since been addressed through a substantial change in communication processes.
On a separate note.
I think from the pilot's point of view this incident is disturbingly familiar to AF447 in so much as nobody was (effectively) flying the plane.
I think flight crew at least in the Bus have traditionally struggled to implement a practical response to the Airbus Golden Rule of Fly Navigate and Communicate.
My experience led me to come up with the following process that can be transposed on to almost any abnormal:
R.I.S.S.E. (recalls will always take precedence over this)
Review the FMA and PFD and respond accordingly. In the case of the Airbus: Obviously read any changes to your FMA; if the FMA asks you to place it in "LVR MCT/LVR CLB" do it. If the little brown chevrons have appeared, hey presto you're now in alternate law, whether ECAM has informed you or not, take note of your pitch and power, QRH unreliable airspeed tables will tell you what you need of you need if you're not sure, etc. Almost everything you need to aviate is on the PFD, if the heart is pumping the pilot flying should not look away until it is all addressed and you've taken a breath.
Identify and confirm the failure or issue in as much as it is possible while still flying the plane, if you can't, come back to flying the plane, all will be revealed in time.
Signs on
Safe position Get yourself to a safe position. It may require following the obstacle clearance procedure, climbing to the MSA, entering a PPOS hold, or
just spending a bit of time clarifying the pitch and thrust setting between yourself and your offsider that you'll be looking for while you troubleshoot.
Then and ONLY then:
ECAM actions or QRH procedure as the case may dictate.