A0283 raises large issues, within a context of what I think it would be accurate to refer to as the overall system of international civil aviation (post w/title "Macro CRM"). While studiously avoiding any of the "flying" issues presented by the report's contents and also (if an understanding of some of the thread criticizing the report is correct) by the accident itself, my premise is that, it appears very nearly certain that efforts to address the underlying problems which caused this accident are not working, and have essentially no chance of working. By "working," I mean "solving the problems and preventing the same or essentially same thing from happening again."
But adding in the larger, "Macro CRM" issues A0283 identifies, is there an urgency brewing? - a need for mobilization of the overall system? Why would this be so? Here:
Originally Posted by
Passenger 389
Unfortunately, the reality we face is a rapid global expansion of aviation coupled with a strong emphasis on beancounting and relatively little experience handflying.
Indeed, ICAO's baseline projections are that overall global air traffic will double within something like the next 12-15 years.
The point I am hoping to make is, where does the learning curve go, next? After AF447, the learning curve seems not to have moved far enough (or, if it did move, it has not kept up with the scope of the problem). Where is the kick in the ar$e
to the system going to come from? (And while observations about the profit motive, pin-headed management of some air carriers, wide variability of compliance with SARPs among various regions and countries, all are valid, they're kind of beside the point, is it not so? Those restraints on progress are well-known and not going away - the point is, how to improvise, adapt and overcome them? Unless you want to disbelieve that a winner never quits and a quitter never wins.)