Pittsextra;
Re: some of the comments attributed to Tinkler-Rose and Ms Smith. Any view as to why none of this was reflected in the AAIB report?
If one was to read the report, page 8;
History of the flight
1.1.2 Text messages and phone calls
At 0649 hrs, the pilot received a call from another pilot who was a colleague from a different helicopter operation. The pilot reportedly told his colleague that the weather was clear at Redhill Aerodrome and at his final destination but he expressed his concern about the weather at Elstree. The pilot told his colleague that he felt under pressure to go ahead with the flight that morning but he had decided to cancel it.
Another pilot (Witness A) was aware of the flights planned by the pilot of G-CRST. He stated to the investigation that the pilot phoned him at 0706 hrs to tell him that the weather at Redhill was clear and that he was going to collect a passenger from Elstree. The pilot said there was fog at Elstree but he was going to fly overhead to see for himself.
At 0718 hrs, the client called the pilot to discuss the weather. The client stated to the investigation that the pilot said he thought the weather might clear earlier than forecast. The client said he would drive to Elstree and call the pilot to keep him advised.
The client reported that, at 0731 hrs, having noticed how poor the weather was during his journey, he called the pilot to suggest that he should not take off until he (the client) had reached Elstree and observed the weather. According to the client, the pilot replied that he was already starting the engines and so the client repeated his suggestion that the pilot should not take off.
page 48
Decision making
2.3.1 The decision to depart from Redhill Aerodrome
It is clear from text message records and witness evidence that the pilot knew before flight that there was fog at Elstree Aerodrome. In a telephone conversation with a colleague at 0649 hrs, he said he was going to cancel the flight because of the weather despite feeling under pressure to continue with it. At 0706 hrs, he reportedly told Witness A that he intended to fly over Elstree to check the weather for himself and, at 0729 hrs, he sent a text to the client saying that he would be “coming anyway will land in a field if I have to”.
The pilot was subject to operational and commercial pressures and was required to consider their associated risks when making the decision to operate the flight. The weather conditions at Redhill Aerodrome had begun to clear (see Figure 10) and the pilot would have been able to return there if the weather at Elstree Aerodrome reflected the forecast. He therefore had a safe contingency plan before departure. However, the weather forecast indicated that a large proportion of the flight was likely to be conducted above the cloud or fog, icing was likely during flight within cloud and there was a low probability of being able to land at Elstree Aerodrome because there was no instrument approach procedure.
https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...014_G-CRST.pdf