It is possibly relevant, but as a background, AD 2014-0217 was originally issued in mid-2014 (before the AirAsia accident) in response to the AA587 A300-600 accident in Queens -- referred to in the AD as "one accident on another aircraft type" -- and a second incident on an A319. The AD added logic to reduce tail plane stress and to activate a Stop Rudder Input Warning (SRIW) function.
The AD quoted above (2014-0217R1) was a revision to update the minimum FAC part numbers required to support SRIW. This revision was requested by Airbus because the original AD had left out a couple Service Bulletins. (The updated SBs were also issued before the AirAsia accident).
Now according to rumors... on the accident aircraft both FACs were shut-off simultaneously, possibly via circuit breakers. If true, then the above AD is a moot point really. The FACs can't provide protections if they are turned off.
So although the AirAsia accident might have involved rudder limits, the above AD was not released in response to this accident, and the promulgated changes even if implemented wouldn't have had any bearing on the accident's outcome.