If they had seen the runway at da/mda , even with the incorrect threshold, a normal landing would have followed.
I wonder if they had ever had formal training on the actual decision requirement at DA.
Before descending below the DA, the pilot making the landing should
already have seen external cues sufficient to confirm that the aircraft was properly placed and going in the right direction for a safe landing. There is limited info in the report (absence of CVR transcript) but it seems possible that there was no decision making at all, they simply ploughed on with the A/P engaged expecting something to show up. One has to wonder if the PM was also head up and not monitoring instruments as he appears not to have noticed the Autopilot Disconnect message on his FMA for some 15 seconds or more.
ICAO DA definition: "A specified altitude or height in the precision approach or approach with vertical guidance at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established..... The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should
have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the desired flight path."