F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

The F-35B, The Naval Services, and Modern American Seapower

The F-35 program has been justifiably maligned, in the press, on Capitol Hill, and in the think-tank community. It has taken forever to field, it is expensive, and it has had its technical challenges. Its Air Force variant—the F-35A, has been criticized as not being up to the job currently carried out by the A-10, and its Navy version—the F-35C—has been criticized for not adequately addressing the most pressing issue of Navy power projection, the reduction in striking range of the carrier air wing. Yet hidden among these programs is the F-35B, the VSTOL variant built for the Marine Corps, which will deploy from U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships of the LHD and LHA classes. It replaces the AV-8B Harrier, and even the harshest critics of the F-35 program have a hard time not acknowledging the significant performance upgrades it brings to the Marine Air Wing, as it brings both considerably more range and ordnance carrying capacity. Yet if these performance increases were all the F-35B fielded, there would be little to support the argument for increased integration. What drives it, and what offers the truly revolutionary opportunity for closer integration, is its radar and electronic warfare system, the APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system. This radar is capable of air-to air operations, air to surface operations, and a wide range of mostly classified electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Simply put, if this airplane is—as was the case for the AV-8B’s—primarily reserved for the support of Marines ashore—it will be represent a colossal lost opportunity to dramatically increase the reach and effectiveness of modern American Seapower.

From the decks of eleven Navy amphibious assault ships, the Marine Corps will operate fifth generation fighters nearly as capable as those that will operate from (eventually) eleven Navy aircraft carriers (range is the main deficit, as the VSTOL F-35B must “bring its runway with it”). And while some suggest that this fact means the distinctions between amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers is blurring, the fact that the amphibious assault ships cannot accommodate a long duration airborne early warning capability and are dramatically less capable of independent operations (fuel and ordnance storage being the primary culprits) limits the utility of this view. Rather than focusing on the “how can the LHD replace the CVN” question, planners should be considering how to more closely integrate the operations of these platforms so that the highly capable aircraft on the amphibious assault ships are used as weapons in the broader maritime fight, rather than simply as expensive close air support. And here—as Hamlet would say—is the rub.