We can't have safety without honesty, never forget that please.
We must have a culture where people can still ask a silly question without getting stamped on, or report something 'silly' which they may have done. If enough data collected then manufacturers may decide to change things.
Millions of hours have been flown on this type, but I bet thousands of similar pump management errors have probably gone unreported.
The other type I fly (same manufacturer) has 4 fuel switches, switched on for flying, switched off for when finished flying - simple, plus a fuel transfer. An auto system sounds sensible to me and solves fuel flow over issues - both switches should probably be on prior to landing at lower fuel states (below 90 kgs) in case of flow over, as in my opinion as there could still be unused fuel in the main tank.
Of course when I dry run a pump at lower fuels (below 200kgs in hover for F PUMP FWD or below about 140 kgs for F PUMP AFT in forward flight) it is absolutely 'ok to have' a F PUMP caution on my CAD - I acknowledged the flashing caution, switched off the respective pump so I put the caution there on my panel. So yes I still believe it is 'ok to have'. At lower fuel states (below 90kgs) you will have both pumps running dry, so iaw procedure they then should both be off, unless you have fuel in the main tank. So 2 Fuel Pump cautions is a picture which might have become 'ok to have' on a 135 if you regularly conduct landings to for instance 60 kgs, which was a previous Day FRF prior to this accident.
If pilots are leaving the dry running pumps then are using work arounds.
Lastly, I think the system is straight forward with a great catch all FUEL caution and Supply Tanks displays - IF THEY ARE WORKING PROPERLY. In my opinion I believe that GSPAO had the same fault as GNWEM.
Last edited by 8Pieced; 11th Nov 2015 at 12:02.
Reason: Clarification