Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report

[8Pieced]

I'm disappointed somewhat :-(

So because the pilot DISMISSED the Low Fuel Warnings, it seems as though some on this forum don't believe that the pilot deserved to have had the benefit of:


Prior knowledge of this type of fault? - In the last few days a previous poster has informed that GXMII had a similar fault to GNWEM but way back in 2004/2005. I'm shocked, because if the pilot of GSPAO had this knowledge, I really don't believe that he would have dismissed the Low Fuel Warnings. This knowledge comes from Pilots, (reporting exact fault, relaying their concerns of the implications of a particular fault based on their flying knowledge), Engineers (Fault finding and reporting), Operators (Investigation, Information sharing, Consulting with Manufacturers), Manufacturers (flight testing, what possible effects could this fault have, is redesign necessary) etc. So yes, the aviation community as a whole has let this crew down.


because this pilot dismissed the Low Fuel Warnings, you think he subsequently didn't deserve to have had his:


4 minutes designed time between engine failures due to fuel starvation? I was trained that I had 4 minutes between failures due to fuel starvation, but we now know otherwise. The outcome would have been very different with 4 minutes OEI. The aviation community has worked together post accident in realising that time between failures is only 30 Seconds ish. But there is more work to be done, we want 4 minutes. So elements of the aviation community have let them down right at the start. What will this customer use my product for, do we need to test it, is it still fit for purpose, could we make it safer still? Some of the fuel flowover information we now have is fairly basic stuff, surely the 4 minutes between flame outs was proved with a few tests, not just straight and level?


......and because the pilot dismissed the Low Fuel warnings, you find it easier to accuse him of:


botching (to carry out a task badly or carelessly) the autorotation? - I agree that the autorotation did not have a successful outcome, and I'm not sure if I would have done any better quite honestly. Does that mean he did it carelessly, or might it be that it was a really very difficult, even for such an experienced aviator? Or could there be other contributory issues, which we might otherwise ignore if we just think he was careless? Early signs of managing NR control were clearly evident, so if he was completely careless there would have only been one Low RPM Warning! But the autorotation would certainly be more difficult to judge at Night, with buildings, Obstructions, Inadequate time and capacity to reach the shed bus (if he had reached shed bus - how long does it take for the rad alt to come on line anyway?), a possible Batt Discharge Gong with a sound exactly the same as NR rising through 106%. I think 'botched' is just a little unfair and disrespectful. So the aviation community need to look a bit more at this aspect. Do we need more training? Do we need auto switch for Landing Lamp and Rad Alt etc. Why haven't we thought about this before - was it too expensive to modify, too difficult?


And finally, because the pilot dismissed the Low Fuel Warnings, you think he doesn't deserve to have had the flight trials (AAIB and Manufacturer) at Dalkeith show that it is possible to get a F PUMP FWD caution due to dry running at a slower airspeed? This simple puts doubt in readers minds, right at the beginning of the report. Also, why can't the general public be presented with a possible scenario like mine which is fairly obvious? This at least uses the AAIBs knowledge of potential faults and demonstrates that the pilot might not have had a FUEL caution to ignore, or supply tank fuel level graphics to ignore etc at the point of dismissing the Low Fuel Warnings.


So, yes I do think the aviation community at all levels has let them down.