First of all I feel that we are dealing with a "Mickey Mouse"fuel management system, with fuel slopping between supply tanks, and supply tanks and the main tank. On top of that we have to rely on a manual intervention to ensure that vital fuel transfer pumps are switched on, using unguarded switches.
I believe that the pilot and crew thought they were dealing with spurious"Low Fuel" lights; this belief is supported by a history of in-flight fuel content defects and subsequent No Fault Founds. In addition, prior to the illumination of a Low Fuel light there should have been an amber FUEL light. However, we read that in the case of an incident on 13th Dec 2013 that the fuel quantity in the supply tanks could be overestimated and that a "Low Fuel" light could appear without any "Fuel" caution being displayed before it. So, with quantity of fuel displayed appearing OK (but overestimated), and no Fuel light, it is only reasonable to assume that any "Low Fuel" light is likely to be spurious, given the history.
But why were the transfer switches OFF? Probable because the pilot received F PUMP FWD and F PUMP AFT warning captions when the contents in the main tank became low, lower that what it ended up with. At some point, due to manoeuvring, fuel from the supply tanks found its way back to the main tank (up to 35 Kgs was possible), and created an even distribution of fuel in the supply tanks. However, fuel going back into the main tank and covering the transfer pumps would not put the F PUMP FWD and F PUMP AFT warning captions on; so no warning. An even distribution of fuel in the supply tanks would account for the time between the two flame-outs being reduced from over 4 mins to just over 30secs. Design Failure
Bottom line is, I cannot believe that three people sat there and listen to alarms going off, watching fuel contents gauges for the supply tanks reducing to zero and did nothing about it, which includes informing ATC, and police on the ground. I also belief that one prime pump switch going from ON to OFF between first responders and the AAIB examination, is a clear indication that the "crime scene" was contaminated. Having said that, the notes do say that the prime pumps are switched on for engine start and certain emergency conditions. I am not sure which prime pump switch was affected, but if it relates to the first engine to flame out then it is possible that he was trying to do are-start, believing that he still had fuel in the supply tank.
Finally, Autorotation. The lack of RAD ALT and spot light must have been major contributing factors to the failure. The report and I think the pilot's notes, state that the power change over switch could be difficult to locate in an emergency. So why was it left like that? Why wait until someone tells you to have an automatic system? And how long does it take for the Rad Alt to run up and give accurate readings once the switch is found; probably a lot longer than the time taken to fall 300ft. DesignFailure.
DV