Yes the ENG FAIL would trump the FUEL PRESS, but you still get FUEL PRESS first, hopefully.
With regards the warning for ROTOR RPM, the report says
"The next recorded warning was rotor rpm signifying an Nr of less than 97%".
Yes, the visual warning was recorded, but without an FDR, how it is not known that all of the 4 ROTOR RPM warnings related to low Nr. It doesn't stipulate exactly.
That was why I was highlighting the similarities between the high Nr gong at 106% and the BAT DISCH gong. Without a timescale for these warnings, they could have all merged into one. That is what I meant by the sound of the gong from the Battery may have affected other audio warnings.
My point about Nr control; is that when you are trained and tested in the real aircraft, you aim to keep 100-103% Nr, to prevent damage to the head/MGB. This gets ingrained, so that when you have something for real, you don't automatically let the Nr rise, because pilots rarely/ever train full done autos in the real thing in a MET helicopter.
This has been proven is some military helicopter accidents where the pilot only flew to the practice single engine Tq figures, as opposed to the real limits (pull the lever up to your armpit) because that's what they always did in training.
But overall, despite all the bells and whistles sounding, and looking at the table 3 on page 33 of the report, there were a few audio warnings, any pilot under a high workload with no spare capacity gets tunnel vision. That was my point about a person's hearing being the first thing to go. (Gongs vs Low tone vs gearbox noises vs cockpit noise). But again, things like that cannot be proven in a case like this.
You can see the difference in the evidence availability between this incident and the Norfolk 139.