Crab:
I can only talk for myself and my actions when I did this job.
At night in particular, I wanted always to have a clear caution panel in front of me - in preparation for that unexpected mal;function to flash up.. If the low fuel warnings kept illuminating whilst I was in the hover, I would either (with the permission of the crew who were tracking someone for instance - on camera and didn't want to lose that target), "nod" the cab fwd thus immersing the pick ups in fuel and extinguish the light(s),which gave me breathing space before the run dry caption(s) came back on again - OR, if it was a prolonged hover and I was unable to manouevre temporarily - switch the pumps off. I drilled myself to ensure they came back on again after departing the hover (but as we see - this is not foolproof).
I hasten to add - in mitigation - this was a reasonably rare occurence because this scenario only manifested itself at the edge of my endurance and I would always be of the mindset that this would have to be the last hover, or close to calling it a day (or night).
MLA @ night was higher than day (90kg vs 60Kg from memory) leaving me an adequate barrier between these constantly illuminating captions telling me "low fuel" and actually having low fuel.
Where I struggle with this crash is that the pilot "probably" did what I did - possibly several times over during prolonged hover - each time eating into his night MLA reserve and apparently creeping inexorably closer to his 'actual' minimum useable fuel remaining. It may have been that he was within touching distance of landing at base and this might have given him false security.
The EC135 'density compensator' type fuel capacitors that indicate fuel content weren't in my opinion - rocket science technology. They always gave sporadic changes in the amount remaining, they always 're-adjusted' themselves after landing (level attitude). One couldn't always rely on them to give out exact digital data that was stable. One simply built this into one's processing and planning.
So one would be sitting in the hover for a considerable few minutes (say 10+) and the cops would ask for time remaining airborne and you would go thru the basic maths minus the MLA. Then - after leaving the hover and stabilising in the cruise, one would find that endurance had then 'magically' improved? So there was always this doubt in one's mind as to exactly how much endurance one had - to the minute.
Once the engine(s) shut down - I think this required a totally new mindset. It required the human brain to ramp up from simply being 'aware/alert'.........instantly......to the limits of arousal, bordering on stress and even resignation as the situation gets further out of control.
This is where training by rote kicks in................but one needed to have done the relevant repetitive (EOL) training for that to happen...and I believe this was not the case.