What can we (possibly) learn from this accident (just my thoughts and appologies for my very limited understanding of the Britisch language) ?
1. The fuel system needs to be changed: Why does the pilot has to put the XFER pumps ON or OFF depending on helicopter attitude ? The XFER pumps should be left on all the time, the system should switch OFF the respective pump if its running dry for 5 minutes and it should switch ON if it senses Fuel again AUTOMATICALLY. Do not bother the pilot with this task. Remove the XFER pump switches.
2. The CAD system should be black when flying in normal conditions. No room for advisory lights here. No room for the fuel indication also. There is too much going on on the CAD. I often dont bother to look at it at all.
3. The Master caution light has to be placed in a lower position. I cant see it even when my chair is in the lowest position.
4. Make the difference between the left and the right supply tank larger. So you have at least 5 minutes to understand that you are in a bad situation (and not a few seconds depending on aircraft attitude and movement).
5. Do not fly missions all the time using all the fuel there is. Everybody wants you to do this and we as pilots like to please our "customers". Land with at least 30 minutes of fuel, get more (night) refuel spots easily available.
6. Put your swivable landing light and the internal communications on the Essential busses. When two engines fail you are busy enough.
7. Fly realistic simulator sessions for at least six hous per year.
Just my thougts but the accident has got me thinking (for what its worth) about my own flying in the 135, certainly at night.