The AAIB report makes reference to issues with the fuel probes on G-SPAO earlier in the year, and explains that these were resolved. It does not explain whether the faults became apparent while the aircraft was in flight, and who was flying it at the time. I am wondering whether the accident pilot had some history with spurious fuel warnings on this aircraft.
Having re read the report this morning, I am curious as to why so little is said about the Bothwell/Uddingston/Bargeddie taskings. Without these interventions, the aircraft would have made it back to base, even with the transfer pumps off. The Bothwell and Bargeddie taskings are described as routine, (no description is offered for the Uddingston tasking) , but we are not told what constitutes routine for a police helicopter. It seems absolutely inconceivable that nothing was said over airwave during this period. Surely the aircraft would at least have had to have reported on the outcome of one task before moving on to the next? The nature and perceived urgency of these requests would have had a direct and material bearing on the workload and behavioural dynamic in the cockpit, and could not be more relevant.
Also missing is any form of analysis of the operational records of the Police helicopter unit. I would have thought for instance that some form of review of fuel loads at landing compared to MLA might have provided a meaningful insight into culture?