Human Factors thoughts
I am intrigued, and somewhat surprised, by the emphasis by some on the Flight Manual information error, in which a stated 3-4 minutes difference in fuel starvation times actually became around 30 seconds.
Surely to reach that point and expect to make use of it is the last desperate hope. I find it hard to believe that anyone views that error as significant in any real flight safety sense - given the quite clear 'land within ten minutes' (after low fuel warning) instruction, also in the FM. I really can't believe that was in any way in the pilot's mind.
To my mind much more significant is the way that the pilot could be expected at intervals during flight to switch on and off the fuel transfer pumps to cope with occasional run dry events due to flight conditions and fuel levels.
Although there was a 'pump run dry' warning, there was no corresponding, 'pump now flooded OK to switch on' advisory. In a busy operational cockpit environment, especially at night, where many other tasks are involved, it would be very easy to overlook the necessary switching back on of the pump(s). Would having an advisory flag and/or bleep be viewed as additional distraction, better avoided?
The possibility of confusion between adjacent switches also seems worth commenting on; I'm intrigued that was not taken further. Ensuring clear tactile distinction between switches, especially when some are vital for in-flight use, would seem sensible to me.
Those potential human behaviour factors I feel could have been further explored. What do other, more experienced, folk think?
Last edited by biscuit74; 23rd Oct 2015 at 20:49.