And yet again, the analysis goes as far as "defence procurement".
If only we could identify which pieces of defence procurement are at fault. Some of them might not look like defence procurement at all.
In the few sketchy details that the Guardian provides we see some key facts:
- Inter-service rivalry -so lack of concentration of resources
- poor Service planning - only 6 trained pilots - hence the 146 hrs rather than thousands - hence the large bill attributed to each drone.
- unforeseen problems with software and certification
No pilots? great planning.
I have no idea how well or poorly the design/development spec was drafted: but for God's sake - these things don't exist in a vacuum. If you don't plan the whole thing from cradle to grave, including the operation of them and all that entails - then you have the efficiency of a coup-led banana republic.
Unforeseen problems. No software project ever delivers to full spec or on time. There are reasons for tis which I won't go into - but they are mostly avoidable.
Certification. Really? so in the risk development meetings (if any were run) at what stage were the risks squashed by the senior stakeholder? After identification?, during the meeting? or prior to it by disapproving strongly of any dissenters? Mate of mine was posted after the ritual trashing of his OJAR because he had the temerity to point out that the emperor's tiny cock was on full view.
But try telling a Colonel or above he isn't qualified to sign-off a commercial or development programme and see how far you get.
Just more evidence to remove commercial decision making from the military.