The critical segment
Having followed this discussion from the beginning with interest, must say I’m dismayed after nearly two weeks’ absence to find it has descended into recrimination and arguments over aspects of litigation. Informed speculation on the causes of an accident may not be universally popular; on its possible legal implications rather less so. Maybe it’s time to try and buck that trend, and get back to the flying?
Despite lack of fast-jet or aerobatics credentials, I’m going to give in to temptation by attempting briefly to summarise what appear to be the key points leading up to this accident, and offer a couple of speculative ideas for the consideration of the real aeronauts here.
Whatever the pilot’s intention during the climb, at some point while still inverted after going over the top he became committed to completing a looping manoeuvre. The mystery, therefore, seems to be the discrepancy between the pitch-rate (low) and the surplus height available (none, or minimal) during the intermediate segment of the looping descent.
That leads one to ask: was the low pitch-rate intentional or unintentional?
If unintentional, was it caused by a flight-control problem or pilot incapacitation? If the former, was it a system failure or a restriction in the movement of the stick?
If intentional, did the pilot underestimate the height needed for such a recovery, or overestimate the height available? The former is implausible, which leaves the unlikely possibility that he simply did not know how little height there was.
We are told that there are three altimeters in the cockpit, but I imagine the pilot would only be using one of them for the display. Is it possible that distraction or dazzle might have prevented him from reading it while going over the top? Subsequently, if so, he might have been relying on visual cues to keep track of progress in the descending half-loop. Finally, could the normal visual cues at that early part of the descent have somehow misled him into overestimating his height?