APG, You said earlier that this is more than
PR and yet the trigger for this review is entirely driven by their feeling that the public need some comfort. It isn't a surprise that there is a feeling of need to do that, but it is a surprise that they seem less confident in their own process.
I say this because the AAIB recommendation 2009-57 following the accident to G-HURR seemed to suggest that they were comfortable with the current operating requirements and that the forum for change would be the DAE seminars.
So now that isn't adequate? Hence I used the word "wobble", because whilst one outcome maybe to do nothing the very fact there is a review is telling.
The term barriers to change was simply a response to your own point here:-
That is NOT to say that this is
PR exercise. It is not. But it is a necessary step following Shoreham.
There are areas that some have questioned in recent years, but not necessarily the ones mentioned by certain posters here. The supervision, mentoring and clearance methods are very tight and well respected.
I'm not able to put words in your mouth as to what those areas are and because you don't say its another one of those "riddle me this" type responses where people hold a view, could have some constructive input but hold back because they don't want to open themselves up, have some feeling of loyalty to those affected or whatever else.
I'm unclear as to why you think forensic investigation is not helped by better resourcing, be that human or capital.
Whilst it is not necessarily a bad thing to conduct a review one can't help but feel it is playing, in part, lip service and too little too late. Regardless of any final outcomes by the AAIB this has already highlighted many elements re: the configuration of the machine, conditions, peoples interpretation of heights as well as the sequence itself that should be obvious potential "gotcha's".