I have no doubt you are right and that the aims are to go some way down the road you suggest in addressing items you suggest being "light" re: risk management. I used the word idiocy for several reasons. The first is what path does that take you down, when many things aviation come down to good judgment?
Take the simple matter of base height, weight, temperature, speed and then factor in the requirement to practice your display. One can see the obvious interplay of factors and if you can't then no doubt your mentor DAE will and can. This isn't rocket science and with good judgment people keep themselves safe. Just how could you try and write a set of rules and regulations for all combinations?
The next question is what does it say about the confidence the CAA has in its own process thus far? When you look at the documentation around flying displays it is inconceivable that this accident would not have been prevented if you take a combination of good judgment and the existing documentation. I know that the hackles will be rising on many peoples neck but I'm doing nothing more sophisticated than taking the same view as fits the majority of all accidents. There are very few new ways to crash.
Finally what could or does this review hope to achieve that the existing format couldn't? Those engaged in this activity professionally have already made up there minds with some degree of certainty why this crash happened and whilst the AAIB report may throw a curved ball its more likely not to (Glasgow helicopter crash - does anyone really expect that to throw up a technical fault, or that it was fuel mismanagement?).
If the CAA wanted to throw resource at this it would be better to aim it toward the AAIB so that reports and follow up become more timely all IMO of course.