Hopefully the following might explain the gap, which I thought appears to infer a controlled and prompt actions from the flight deck.
BA SOP's :- After STOP called and being achieved, PNH might well advise TWR of intentions.
Capt continues (else resumes) as PH and when safely stopped (if circumstances & brain functions allow : stop close to a taxiway for easy access of emergency vehicles; if RWY width & surroundings appropriate, nose into side of fault if headwind; away if tailwind).
Capt calls "Identify the Failure".
FO presumably called "Engine Fire Left"; fault confirmed between both.
Capt calls for "Fire Engine Left Memory Items".
FO identifies the appropriate switch, monitored and confirmed by Capt before actioning each switch.
Quote:
Autothrottle Arm Switch ... Off
Thrust Lever Left ... Closed
Fuel Control Switch Left ... Cutoff
Engine Fire Switch Left ... Pull
If Fire Eng message remains -
Engine Fire Switch Left ... Rotate to stop & hold 1 sec
If Fire Eng message still displayed after 30 secs -
Engine Fire Switch Left Rotate to other bottle
Remember, neither pilot can see anything more than part of the wing tip on his side even when pressing ones cheek against the cockpit window.
Capt must rely on significant information from ATC and/or cabin crew.
BA Cabin Crew are authorized under certain 'catastrophic' circumstances to contact the flight crew directly rather than going through the Cabin Service Director/Purser.
(Health Warning : author of above was a 35 year career with BA ending up as Capt 777 for his last 9 years before retiring over 5 years ago)
Great job by the BA flight crew. Some people who are not pilots forget there are critical checklists to perform even in a time sensitive situation. The BA crew worked together and the result was no fatalities. I think flight crews have learned a lot since Manchester and it showed.