I worked for many years for a European major (no prizes for guessing which one) which has a reputation for having “different” SOPs’ from most other airlines. In the take off case the standard briefing was:-
Either pilot may call stop for the following malfunctions.
1. Engine failure indicated by two or more parameters
2. Any fire warning
3. Take-off configuration warning
4. “Windshear ahead” annunciation
Additionally, 5. if the co-pilot is PH he can call stop if the runway is blocked or he has significant control difficulties.
To amplify the rationale, 1. two or parameters ensures the engine has actually lost power, if, for example, the N1 indication disappears or drops to zero but the EGT, oil pressure, temp etc. are normal, chances are the engine is developing normal power. 2. Any fire warning because it is just as dangerous being in the air with a wheel well fire, cargo fire etc as an engine fire. 3. Self evident. 4. In a/c fitted with predictive windshear system. 5. PNH should be monitoring the EICAS and may not see an obstruction as early as PH who will largely be looking out of the window!
Could anyone argue with this? The few extra seconds gained by not having to communicate the failure to the Captain, his thinking time and subsequent reaction could make the difference between stopping on the paved surface and an overun and at V2 speeds potentially in excess of 180kts this is significant. I doubt any captain would knowingly get airborne with any of the above conditions present. Whilst the emphasis at speeds approaching V2 was to “go” it was more likely that a successful reject would be made near this speed.
To expand the thread slightly, at the same time all duties were exchanged when it was P2’s sector, from the flight planning stage to thrust lever handling etc., the only exception was at the end of an RTO after the parking brake had been set, so that the Captain could make the decision whether or not an evacuation was neccessary.
I now work for another European company, on the same type, who use the standard Boeing “one man and his dog” procedures where, in theory, a co-pilot will never make a decision on fuel required, nor even taxi the aircraft until his upgrade course. No wonder in my previous company the upgrade was largely a matter of routine regarding aircraft operating procedures whereas in my present company it is a major trauma!
Before someone jumps in and says “but didn’t you use the split approach philosophy also”, yes we did and I would argue in favour of it, but that is a whole new topic. At the end of the day, so long as the whole pilot force use the same SOPs’ neither is better or worse than the other.
The only problem I have is to remember to say “reject” on an RTO after 30+ years of saying “stop” Fortunately during my last few sim checks P2 hasn’t misunderstood my intentions!
Best wishes.