AAMs - Exactly what is an acceptable war reserve ?
I recall reading something about the RAF only having sufficient air-to-air missiles for 2 weeks of sustained combat during the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, then of course there is the never ending debate about AIM-9Ls in the Falklands and where they came from, and how many we actually had in stock.
All this led me to wonder just how an Air Force, any Air Force, determines just how many short/medium/long range AAMs are adequate for a given fleet of fighters.
I know that you base that decision to a large extent on your perceived threat - a thousand Soviet MiG 23s is different for NATO (of old) than for some nation with an aggressive neighbour who has a minimal air component to their armed forces.
But if we take say, the French Air Force as an example - what would be an acceptable war reserve for them based on the size of their fighter wings and perceived threats in the European theatre ?
Anyone know of the logic behind such planning considerations ?