"commercial success?"; no, but it had never been so intended - it was a political invention.
1971. China has ordered (to be) 35 Trident 2E/3B, talking about lots of other things, as US at that time had an embargo. What else would you like? More than 2 engines to get into Lhasa, they said. So Brit Govt. made Launch Aid available 8/73 to initiate 146. Ceased funding it 10/74 after US lifted its embargo and CAAC ordered 10 707-320B/C, with more products to follow.
29/4/77, Brit. Govt. becomes proud owner of BAe...with no civil work (the ex-HSAL side had A300B wings, but sales were pitiful). Through to mid-78 Govt. tried to find civil workload. Boeing and MDC offered workshare on paper projects, all confining BAe. to metal-bashing subordinate. New BA put out a tender for European short haul, to which BAe. bid a resurrected 146, lost 3/78 to 737-200ADV, submitted on a (then-innovative) walkaway lease scheme, where Boeing laid off future loss-risk into the capital markets. BAe. studied and learned.
In Autumn,1978 PM Callaghan defined the future of UK civil Aero. He declined airframe involvement in 757/767/MD11, while Aiding RR to bid for their engines; he funded (to be >£200Mn) wing for A310; bought back (£250Mn) into Airbus Industrie (20%); and relaunched 146 (10/7/78) with £250Mn Launch Aid, with risk-sharing partners Short (pods), SAAB (back end) and AVCO (ALF502 and wing): no imminent prospects, but no better 'ole to occupy designers (various JET and X-11 schemes not launched).
146, later RJ, sales were languid. BAe. was privatised 2/81; its Commercial Aircraft Division reported its first profit in 1998, of £12Mn. before Provision of £51Mn. necessary for its Asset Management Organisation to unload Residual Value risk into capital markets. In effect the risk-bearing customer for most 146/RJ was BAe.