Whilst I always passed simulator checks with flying colours route checks and similar were a different matter.
In the mid 70s I had a route check with one of the three guys who gave testimony against management and in the Staines Disaster public inquiry.
Brave fellow as such a stance can, and often does, lead to an enforced career change as happened to the most verbal and knowledgeable amongst the trio.
The annual route check was something feared as not only a test of SOPs but of overall knowledge and decision making.
By this time I was starting to come to grips with “The Gripper” as the Trident 1 was nicknamed. Although it had been re-engined it wouldn’t carry a full load out of Heathrow on a hot summers day and the fable of it only getting airborne because of the curvature of the Earth was quite near to the truth (and runway end on occasions - hence frangible approach lighting).
There were two memorable parts of the check; the first being my descent into Marseilles as I closed the throttles at TOD and didn’t touch them until fully established in landing configuration on the ILS around 1,500-2,000ft.
Rather risqué although we had thankfully left those dark days of needing to do a stabilised approach from three grand. Later the criteria was set to 1,000ft although anyone who can really handle an aircraft knows that the last 50ft are the important bits.
We had also just started getting into fuel conservation and the “score” after engine shutdown was important. What I didn’t know until 40 years afterwards that this was erroneous as all of our planning calculations were made at max weights and contained contingency fuel!
A similar lack of knowledge was wrt min drag and a dirty aircraft – we all knew that clean it was around 250 knots…the upper limit of droop deployment ..as many a descent faltered wrt the ATC requirement of a min ROD of 1,000fpm.
The last bit of my check was into Heathrow and knowing the traffic problems I flew more conservatively but still didn’t do a dragging it in phase (and hadn’t needed the poor planning lever – airbrakes).
ATC then were messing about with reduced approach separation which became a remarkable success and we were following an Alitalia DC 8. We were both given “maintain 180 knots to the outer marker” (we had inner markers in those days).
Now one of my bug bears is the recent CAA requirement to have an English test – having English O level pass at a time when it had more value that a tuppenny stamp and recently listening to French controllers who obviously wouldn’t pass one even if they had the book open – but in 1974 it might have stopped a missed approach and what happened next if the Italians had a similar requirement.
I need to add that some of our captains ignored the requirement, didn’t inform ATC and reduced to final approach speed early. (all to do with lack of ability, knowledge and confidence).
Unfortunately Giuseppe reduced final approach speed early and this was only noticed by the controller who instructed us to reduce to minimum safe approach speed. On a Trident 1 this was much faster than all civil aircraft at that time bar Concord(e) and way below our minimum drag speed although I never had sight of a dirty drag curve – if one ever exisited.
The inevitable happened around 2 grand – my brain went “F@ck - always on a bl@@dy route check” at the same time as initiating the go around. This bit is hazy but IIRC it was an auto go-around but it was a long time ago.
Full power and go-around pitch – followed by reducing flap and undercarriage up. But at 2,000 ft the Speys didn’t produce the same power as close to the ground (WAT). When I checked the airspeed it had diminished and we weren’t that far from the death rattle when this had started (it wasn’t uncommon to get stall warnings in turbulent conditions).
This is where "what have I done wrong and what should I do started" going through my brain.
Obvious was get rid of drag…undercarriage up but the “forgot the gear siren would have waken all in the front of the aircraft” and wasn’t SOP…
Retract the flaps would have given us a stall warning and we had already lost 3 airliners and severely damaged a forth with inadvertent stalls; but we were just hanging there and except for divine intervention from above or the left hand seat nothing would happen so I lowered the nose (on a missed approach!).
Nothing was mentioned in the debriefing and I wasn’t going to be stupid enough to mention my doubts. When I got home I read everything and anything but came to the conclusion that SOPs don’t cover everything.
I was to have a far more dangerous incident years later which without my intervention would have been in the world news – more later as a beautiful sunny day and going to make sand castles with my grandson.