Part II
VIII.-
Minutes later, the Wessex V headed over to the site of the explosion of the second Skyhawk (close by Avenger), the water coloured turquoise and remains from the aircraft floating on the surface. (69) From Andromeda's Lynx it was also possible to see the coloured water and the remains of an ejector seat sinking slowly. (70) An NCO on board the Wessex lower a hook on a line and recovered one man life-raft , full of holes. Avenger also launched a boat and recovered a small piece of the aircraft and part of a body. I think it was a life jacket or something similar. I think the Wessex also recovered some other things.
IX.-
The combat reports immediately after the attack were a little confused. Exeter reported that she had shot down a Super Etendard, and like that another aerial contact of indeterminate characteristics (72). At the same time Avenger logged an Exocet (73) and a little later added an A-4. (74)
Days later, the Admiral's staff concluded that the CVBG had been attacked by one or two Super Etendards, accompanied by three or four Skyhawks (75), and that possibly Exeter, with its Sea Darts, had hit two of the A-4s. The commander of Exeter, additionally, in a new evaluation of the incident, concluded with 100% certainty that his ship had shot down one of the two A-4s (76). He also indicated that an Exocet had penetrated to the inner ring of ships, and that another possible Exocet had hung up and not left its launch aircraft, could not fly or had flown in tandem with the first. (77)
However, with the analysis of the A-4s involved in the attack (that we know were four), he represented Exeter had shot down a second A-4 at 17:30:30 Z, when Avenger states that it was attacked by three aircraft at 17:37Z. Additionally, it was calculated that the launched Exocet ran for a total of 64 km (35 nm), in a straight line from where it was launched to where it fell into the water (that is to say more if one bears in mind the possible changes in course of the missile). The quotes distance is much greater than the maximum range of the missile if launched at low lever (around 50km).
X.-
The attack on the 30th May 1982 took the British completely by surprise. According to the commander of the fleet, “
As an attack mission, it was not badly thought out, even though it did require a very long round trip.” (78). The commander of HMS Invincible (J.J. Black) considered that the Argentines:
“Tried an ingenious plan, that was very nearly successful” (79)
According to the CO of HMS Exeter, Hugh Balfour:
“They carried out a remarkable mission, flying miles and miles from Argentina, refuelling those single seat aircraft several times.... truly an exceptional, efficient and exciting mission. I have a great respect for the Argentines that carried out this mission which was equal to any other. It was very brave (80).
For the British Task Force, from the initial detection of the voices on HF radio, until the egress of the Skyhawks, had lasted for only six scant minutes. The success in repelling the attack, they considered, was due to the timely deployment of chaff, the rapid manoeuvring of the ships in showing the bow or stern to the missile in order to minimise the target area. (81)
As a lesson, it was understood that the firing of chaff should be carried out as soon as possible following a detection of an Agave radar.
XI-
Within just a few hours, it was clear (to the British Forces) that the attack on the fleet had involved the frigate HMS Avenger and the destroyer HMS Exeter as the protagonists. For this reason, the Officer On Watch had written in the part of the ships log reserved for the day's summary "Attacked by Super Etendards - no damage" (82); and Exeter's wrote "Defence Watches in the TEZ. Group attacked by Super Etendards" (83); and Avenger's recorded only "Defence watches - Operation Corporate". (84) Almost immediately the submarines in the theatre received the transmission "Four aircraft attacked and missed the Invincible, of which two were shot down.” (85).
Finally, a report was created and sent to the headquarters, which informed the Cabinet and this informed Parliament that "An unsuccessful attack on HMS Invincible on the 30th May by Argentine Super Etendard aircraft equipped Exocet" (86). Therefore, the only thing that is clear was that nobody was exactly clear about what happened during the attack on HMS Invincible.
References
1)- Sciaroni (2012:59-73).
2)- Arancibia Clavel & De la Maza Cave (2003:354).
3)- Operation Shutter” developed since late May to early June, to report take offs from Río Grande, Río Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia airbases. Unknown forces were there at the time (An examination of Argentine air effort during the Falklands Campaignen DEFE 58/273)
4)- HMS Valiant, on May 30th detected a possible fast craft (TNC 45 type) north of Staten Island. Also, classified four air contacts according her limited ESM equipment: Hércules, Dagger, Bandeirante and Tracker. Weather was bad that day, because no contact was validated visually. Le Marchand, T. (HMS Valiant) Report of Proceedings.
5)- Le Marchand, T. (HMS Valiant) Report of Proceedings.
6)- HMS Invincible Falklands Islands Campaign Diary (DEFE 69/844).
7)- HMS Invincible ship log.
8)- Memorando a Margaret Thatcher del Ministerio de Defensa (“Exocet Attack, 25th May”).
9)- Johnson, A. (HMS Onyx) Report of Proceedings.
10)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82. File dated June 8th, 1982signed by Adm John Fieldhouse.
11)- McManners (2007:184).
12)- McManners (2007:184).
13)- Woodward y Robinson (2012:430).
14)- Brown (1989:255)
15)- All times Zulu
16)- Friedman (2006:393).
17)- HMS Invincible ship log, HMS Avenger ship log, HMS Exeter ship log and HMS Hermes ship log. All logs corroborated the alarm at 1730z, but Invincible´s 1731z.
18)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 10 2014.
19)- Friedman (1997:522).
20)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 10 2014
21)- Woodward and Robinson (2012:430).
22)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
23)- Email from Ken Griffiths, February 11 2014.
24)- Zippo call alerts the units about a missile attack inminent o develope. ONE: missile detected close; TWO: missile detected at long distance; THREE: air missile launched from long distance; FOUR: missile attack inminent.
25)- Evans (2007).
26)- Report of Captain Salt, Loss of HMS Sheffield, Board of Inquiry. Annex C.
27)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
28)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
29)- Woodward and Robinson (2012:429).
30)- Middlebrook (1988:287).
31)- Brown (1989:255).
32)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, February 11 2014.
33)- Middlebrook (1988:287).
34)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, February 11 2014.
35)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
36)- Middlebrook (1988:287).
37)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
38)- Email from Ken Griffiths, February 11 2014.
39)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
40)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
41)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 6 2014.
42)- Balfour (1994).
43)- Balfour (2009).
44)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, February 11 2014.
45)- McManners (1986).
46)- Balfour (2009).
47)- Middlebrook (1988:287).
48)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
49)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, February 11 2014.
50)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, October 2 2012.
51)- Middlebrook (1988:287).
52)- Balfour (1994).
53)- Email from Ken Griffiths, February 17 2014.
54)- Op Corporate Falklands Conflict, 820 Naval Air Squadron, HMS Invincible flight report (DEFE 69/838).
55)-Telconf with C. H. Cantan, March 28 2014. Given information was also at Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
56)- Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
57)- Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
58)- Flight Lt Mortimer was shot down two days later.
59)- HMS Hermes ship log. At 1747z Hermes launched two Sea Harrier and two RAF Harrier Gr3
60)- King (1983:112).
61)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 6 2014.
62)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 10 2014.
63)- Inskip (2012:129).
64)- Inskip (2012:129).
65)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
66)- HMS Invincible ship log.
67)- Email from Rod Fearnley, February 14 2014.
68)- Email from Nycholas Lutwyche, May 13 2014.
69)- Benson (2012:213)
70)- Email from Larry Jeram Croft, February 6 2014.
71)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke, February 12 2014.
72)- HMS Exeter ship log.
73)- HMS Avenger ship log.
74)- Email from Tony Bolingbroke February 12 2014.
75)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
76)- Balfour (1994).
77)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
78)- Woodward and Robinson (2012:429-30).
79)- McManners (2007:184).
80)- Balfour (1994).
81)- Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82.
82)- HMS Invincible ship log.
83)- HMS Exeter ship log.
84)- HMS Avenger ship log.
85)- From a personal diary of a HMS Conqueror crewmember.
86)- South Atlantic Presentation Unit (82) 30 en Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre).
Bibliography.
Publicaciones
Arancibia Clavel, P. y De la Maza Cave, I. (2003).
Matthei, mi testimonio, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Random House.
Balfour, H. Exeter Antigua to the Falklands, 2009,
HMS Exeter 1982 [Recuperada: lunes, 5 de mayo de 2014]
Balfour, H. (1994). IWM Interview, (grabación de audio), Londres: Imperial War Museum, Número de catalogo 14596.
Benson, H. (2012). Scram!, Londres: Random House.
Brown, D. (1989). The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, Londres: Arrow Edition.
Evans, M. (2007) “Legal fears left Atlantic Conveyor defenceless”,
Diario The Times, Edición del 11 de diciembre.
Friedman, N. (2006). The Naval Institute guide to world naval weapon systems – Fifth Edition, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Inskip, I. (2012). Ordeal by Exocet: HMS Glamorgan and the Falklands War, Londres: Frontline Books.
King, P.G. (1983). “HMS Invincible: some individual recollections”,
The Naval Review, Londres: The Naval Review, Año LXXI, Nro. 2, Abril, 108-118.
McManners, H. (1986). “Avenger”, Revista Cuerpos de Elite, Barcelona: Planeta - De Agostini, Nro. 97.
McManners, H. (2007). Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Londres: Ebury Press.
Middlebrook, M. (1988). Task Force. The Falklands War 1982, Londres: Penguin Books.
Sciaroni, M. (2012). “Alerta temprana desde submarinos. La experiencia de la Royal Navy en Malvinas 1982”, Revista de la Escuela de Guerra Naval, Buenos Aires: Escuela de Guerra Naval, Año XLII, Nro. 58, Octubre, 59-73.
Woodward, J. F. y Robinson, P. (2012). One Hundred Days, Londres: Harper Collins Publishers.
British official records:
Logs:
HMS Invincible ship log (ADM 53/189407); HMS Hermes ship log (ADM 53/189351); HMS Avenger ship log (ADM 53/190138) y HMS Exeter ship log (ADM 53/189189).
Records of Operations:
Exocet Attack, 25th May (PREM 19/650).
Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82 (DEFE 58/273).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict, 820 Naval Air Squadron, HMS Invincible flight report (DEFE 69/838).
HMS Invincible Falklands Islands Campaign Diary (DEFE 69/844).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
An examination of Argentine air effort during the Falklands Campaign/Operational Research Branch report (DEFE 58/273).
Report of Captain Salt, Loss of HMS Sheffield, Board of Inquiry. Annex C (Naval Historic Branch).
South Atlantic Presentation Unit (82) 30 (Thatcher MSS -Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/2/163).
HMS Onyx, Report of Proceedings
HMS Valiant, Report of Proceedings (Naval Service FOI Coordination Cell – request 10-12-2010-101254-002)
All documents on the National Archives británicos (at Kew), unless contrary statement.
People interviewed
Larry Jeram Croft 815 NAS (HMS Andromeda)
Kenneth Griffiths HMS Cardiff
Tony Bolingbroke HMS Avenger
Charles Cantan 801 NAS (HMS Invincible)
Rod Fearnley HMS Invincible
Nicholas Lutwyche HMS Invincible
Bill Jarvis died last year. Rest in Peace.
Translation: Andy Smith
Sources: ACCIONES AERÉAS EN EL CONFLICTO DEL ATLÁNTICO SUR 1971-1982. Buenos Aires 8, 9 y 10 de septiembre de 2014. ACTAS DEL III CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA AERONÁUTICA MILITAR ARGENTINA “ACCIONES AÉREAS EN EL
CONFLICTO DEL ATLÁNTICO SUR, 1971-1982”.