Airbubba, thanks for the SOP info. However, this would not remove the potential for a false mind-set where the normal config was set before 1000ft, and then setting a non-normal config at 500ft which might not be associated with an unstable approach because the SOP was previously checked as satisfactorily. It’s easy to assume with hindsight that the flap aspect of the SOP should apply throughout the approach, but with habit where the focus is on speed, GS, etc, humans forget.
deefer, most accidents have contributory factors way back in time; investigators might not appreciate their significance or even fail to look for them as indicated here.
“All of us make a bad landing from time to time...and many times we can't explain why”, but at least the factors which could have affected the landing should be considered and questioned “what if the circumstances were slightly different”.
There are always reasons, not all discoverable, some constructed to fit the situation (which are hazardous because you believe that ‘it’ won’t happen to you), but none can be found without looking and thinking about them, a failure which appears to be the case in this investigation.
The crew probably believed that they were acting normally, the decisions valid for the situation that they perceived; they were doing a good job. Only hindsight judges differently, WHY?
Why did the crew have such beliefs or come to the decisions that they did; ‘Often times there is no explainable reason, but of course the NTSB have to find some tosh to write....and that is exactly what they did this time’, exactly, but this does not excuse the lack of questions and considerations in this investigation.
Instead of the NTSB quoting safety statistics why not review the operator’s violation / GA data and compare; assuming that this operator does collect and review the data.
Lonewolf, “what explains landing nose low ..”, good question.
What about the HUD use, can anyone describe what the guidance system would display during a late off-course take-over at low altitude.