Unless I missed them, where are the conclusions? I read nothing about the fact that the crew were kept pretty busy threading themselves through weather, or that the co-pilot seemed to be a little bit behind the airplane. The Captain remarked several times that he should be slowing up, and it seemed to me that she thought that "coaching" him on aspects of using the automatics was appropriate when considering the need to slow the airplane and get it descending at the same time.
Furthermore, looking at the FDR traces it appears that 90% of the final approach was flown pretty close to the 3 degree path and at a relatively stable speed near to the target. It was only in the very latter part of the approach, and quite a while after the flap 40 selection, that the airplane drifted slightly high. Not by much though.
Sure the report has to look into every possible non-compliance of SOPS, but does it not appear to anyone else here that this accident was not caused by non-compliance with SOPS, but more it was a case of a late, (and maybe unnecessary?) take over of the controls - and one that was unfortunately mis-handled?
Would a go-around have saved the day? Maybe yes, but as has already been noted by the FAA 97% of the time we do not go-around when SOPS call for it. This is surely the elephant in the room, and one that the Human Performance guys need to accept and find a work around. My (simplistic) guess is that pilots are generally "mission orientated" rather than being robots which blindly follow instructions day in and day out. Take cross wind landings for example, and the hundreds of very hairy ones that have been captured on video. Of these do you recall many that didn't actually land, but instead went around well before the point of touch down? Not many is my guess, and of the few that did go around I would bet that it was only due to the airplane being completely out of shape in the last few seconds.
As for "I got it" instead of "I have control" this is certainly nitpicking. The instruction was given in the heat of the moment and was clearly understood and acknowledged. If taking control of an aircraft was a common occurrence perhaps crews would have the presence of mind to recall and use verbatum the standard phraseology, but when faced with the rare requirement to avoid imminent danger stating what is obvious using a more common and appropriate phrase (considering the time constraint) is only normal and expected human behaviour.
I was disappointed with the report.