JTO
It is a distortion to say that the MoD lied over ESF. Whilst it exposed a massive gap in corporate knowledge it would be unfair to compare this to a deliberate lie - those that were asked simply did not know.
JTO, we have corresponded privately many times and I respect your position.
My perspective is from having spoken at length to the QC representing a widow, who called me from the Coroner's Court after MoD claimed not to know about ESF. I e-mailed him the ESF specifications I mentioned by return, and he submitted them to the Court. I did not, for example, breach the OSA, as they were freely available on-line; which made the MoD denial all the worse.
You probably know why I could not attend in person, but a respected contributor and aviation journalist made sure I had notes of, especially, the evidence of the IPTL. I would not say he lied over Fitness for Purpose, but his errors were gross and misled the Court. But very many in MoD, including anyone with airworthiness delegation, would/should have known he misled, and it was incumbent upon MoD to tell the Court this as soon as possible. They did not.
These errors, and his apparent total lack of understanding of what FFP is, how to achieve it and his role in this was utterly appalling. Appointing people to critical posts who are totally unsuited and untrained is an organisational failing in MoD. Again, any technical staff in his IPT should have known the team's precise role in FFP, yet none stepped forward.
On the subject of Vulnerability Assessment, he claimed the IPT and DPA/DE&S in general had nothing whatsoever to do with it. That it was correct the IPT was not even invited to meetings. If he'd read the regulations, he'd have known he and the Design Authority are actually the lead. I simply pointed the Court to the mandated regulations which, again, he and his staffs were required to know backwards.....
“The Chief Designer SHALL (i.e. mandatory)
consult with the Integrated Project Team Leader (IPTL) and establish whether, and how, the vulnerability of the aeroplane Defined and Specified Threat Effects will be assessed and consider how subsequent design changes, if any, will be introduced.”
Key to this is "defined and specified threats". The regulations actually list a series of threats; #1 is inert projectiles, #2 is incendiary, and so on. That is, the DA and MoD don't have to think of the threat that brought the aircraft down, they are
required to consider it and, if it is deemed a threat, implement the regulations (which call up ESF). And, if they don’t consider it a threat, record their reasoning why. And, by definition, if the threat is subsequently present, the mitigation is well known and can be implemented immediately.
As for when ESF was offered to MoD, our mandated regulations, if implemented, would require it to be notified by Lockheed to (a) the MoD Technical Agency (named individual responsible for the build standard), and (b) the Design Custodian (Marshall). (They were later appointed Design Authority for the UK standard in 1988). It is utterly deranged for anyone to suggest MoD did not know of ESF. It was in Lockheed's base build standard and their contract with MoD would, buried in the detail, include the cost of deviating from that standard by not having ESF fitted; even if the only action was a call-up in the GA drawing. Nor is it remotely conceivable that Marshall, upon realising there was an opportunity to modify C130 up to the base US standard, would not submit a costed proposal. There are just so many ways of MoD knowing of this. I still have my submission to the Court listing six.
When interviewed on 22.10.08 (BBC Radio 5, 1730 hrs), Bob Ainsworth MP admitted MoD knew of ESF in the 60s, but the "RAF didn't consider this the top priority". Referring to threats/vulnerabilities he said "We should have had the procedures in place to deal with this failure". He deliberately missed the point, as he'd been told beforehand the procedures were in place, they just weren't implemented. He also said the Coroner exposed the failures. Well, it was actually a series of very critical internal audits and ART reports between 1988 and 1998.
This is a litany of incompetence and deceit. Given the sheer number of people who knew the truth and let the IPTL's evidence stand, it is conscious misleading, by omission and commission. That is in many ways worse than simple lying, because it almost always requires collusion.