Originally Posted by
Genstabler
Please pay attention children! My point was that if Coastal Command had been a RN command from the outset instead of RAF, there is no certainty that it would have ended up going down the ultimately disastrous Nimrod path anyway. More likely that they would have followed the example of other friendly navies, operated Orion or Atlantique and now be introducing P8 into service.
Not the case, I'm afraid.
The RAF wanted either the Orion or the Atlantic to replace the Shackleton; as there was some British content in the Atlantic already, the Air Staff felt that the Atlantic was probably going to be the better option politically.
The RAF/MoD attempted from the outset to get a quid pro quo from the French to ease the political aspect, with attempts to get a French buy of P1154s (which would've saved that project) Canberra PR9s, or even Hunter T7s to offset the Atlantic purchase; the French didn't bite, and...
...the government, via Roy Jenkins at the Ministry of Aviation demurred, and blocked procurement of the Atlantic, insisting that a British made aircraft be procured; this programme then gained traction because it offered other benefits, namely that it could be sold as partially offsetting the cancellation of P1154, HS681 and - in due course - TSR 2 in favour of US products with the procurement of P1127 plus something else; that 'something else' was Comet MR, aka Nimrod.
Nimrod was saved from the 1965 defence cuts, because - as Healey put it:
Though my initial savings depended on the substitution of three American aircraft for three British, I was able to provide valuable work for the British aircraft industry by ordering the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft and... the Harrier.
The RN would have been subjected to
exactly the same pressures. RAF or RN - the answer would've been 'Comet MR/Nimrod', and there is no reason to suppose that the Fleet Air Arm MPA force, under the 'Genstabler Construct' would've found itself able to resist the siren calls for the MRA4...