Is the reevaluation of the 2,443 buy quantity because of the cost per copy, or because it is becoming more recognized the F-35 is incapable of accomplishing its mission?
I don't know, and neither do you. However, I believe neither of your speculations are correct. I believe a more likely answer is that after evaluating the actual threat (rather then the threat estimated years ago when the 2443 number was established) it was determined that 2443 is excessive, especially in the face of the fairly recent decision to keep the F-15 flying for another few decades, rather than retire them. In addition, priorities have changed in the intervening years. Tactical aircraft procurement is no longer at the top of the list of priorities.
The customer asked for these attributes in the early stages of the program definition, demands only come later when you are in deep s**t having accepted the order when you haven't produced what you promised,
With due respect, this statement shows gross ignorance of the history of the JSF program. You appear to be uninterested in historical facts, but I will provide a (over simplified) synopsis for those who are interested.
Two forerunners of JSF were JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology) program and ASTOVL (Advanced STOVL - the Harrier replacement) These two SEPARATE programs were merged at the
direction of Congress in 1994. This was a political decision, and not one proposed by industry
JAST/JSF was also heavily influenced by the A-X program. This was a Navy program to develop a stealthy twin-engine, two-crew attack aircraft after the ATA and NATA programs failed. USAF decided to join this program and make it joint. This was a pure attack aircraft along the lines of a stealthy A-6. Congress (not industry) got into the act and required
by law that this program also produce a fighter and it became A/F-X. The law also required a dem/val phase that included flying prototypes. Another program with a big influence on JSF was MRF (multi-role fighter). This was to be a small, cheap lightweight fighter to replace the F-16 and the Harrier and would include a conventional version and an ASTOVL version. Congress (not industry) directed that all these programs be merged. USN was very unhappy that their twin-engine, two-crew airplane was being forced by Congress to be single engine, single crew, but USN was not able to overcome the political pressure.
There were FIVE contractor teams competing for what would become JSF. Lockheed was a team member (but NOT the prime) on
three of those teams. The five teams were reduced to three, with McDonnell Douglas the prime for one of the three. But MDC's proposal failed the next cut when its STOVL proposal failed to meet tCogress's requirement, even though its CTOL and CATOBAR proposals were superior in many ways to those of its competitors. It was only after the teams were reduced to two that Lockheed became the prime for one of those teams (Boeing was the other, with MDC joining Boeing). And by the time the teams were reduced to two, the major specs were cast in concrete. The airplane (by LAW) had to be single engine, had to be single crew (Congress' way of attempting to keep growth in check), and had to have CTOL, CATOBAR, and STOVL versions (Congress' way of maximizing commonality between the services.) And like A/F-X, there had to be a dem/val phase that included flying prototypes. And BTW, the basic kinematic performance of both the Boeing and the Lockheed prototypes was fairly firmly established during dem/val. So this whole "less than stellar in-close dog fight performance" has been known for literally over a decade. This latest blog post is nothing new.
The absolute prerequisite to run a successful Concurrent Engineering program is that you not only must have a properly staffed organization setup that differs from traditional program organizations, but one where the designated participants know more about what they are developing than they don't know. For L-M, the scales tipped to more of what they didn't know having the most weight.
You fail to realize that those scales were equally tipped against every other contractor. I highly ambitious development program is NOT a candidate for a highly ambitious concurrent engineering program. But Congress directed it. And Congress both writes the laws and signs the checks, so they almost get their way.
Too bad you stopped fly fast jets so soon, those like the F/A-18E/F. Had you stayed longer you would have flown on two engines that were designed developed and produced using the risky process of Concurrent Engineering.
Oh please. Now you're just being juvenile, while remaining utterly clueless about history. The F414 engine in the Super Hornet is an uprated development of the F404 engine in the Classic Hornet. Indeed the original design goal was to make the F414 fit an F404 installation so F404s could be replaced by F414s. Clu4U, programs that upgrade mature products are
ideal candidates for concurrent engineering. Programs that are developing multiple new technologies that are still in their infancy are very poor candidates for concurrent engineering. And if it has escaped you, JSF/F-35 is attempting to integrate more new tech in a single airframe than has ever been attempted before.
Now that you are on the other side of the fence at Boeing (assuming that is true)......
Yet more juvenile rantings.
I had some really good engineering experiences with both MD on the military side and Boeing on the commercial side helping them with items we were doing that they could do to reduce costs, lead times and improve performance. Should you ever get into a position dealing with the US DoD, as the famous C&W song goes "Know when to hold them and know when to fold them", don't try to BS them as L-M did on the F-35 program…
How precious! I'll be sure to keep your sage advice in mind......for the next 30 seconds or so.