KenV,
“The program has not yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its inception,” the committee’s question starts. “Do you believe the nation can afford to procure these aircraft at a cost of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20 years for an aircraft design that will be 30 years old at the completion of the program procurement phase?” Then the committee asks Dunford if he supports the requirement for 2,443 Joint Strike Fighters.
Is the reevaluation of the 2,443 buy quantity because of the cost per copy, or because it is becoming more recognized the F-35 is incapable of accomplishing its mission?
Hmmmm. The customer is the one who demanded industry produce a single airframe that could do CTOL, CATOBAR, and STOVL. Industry had no choice but to try to meet the customer's demands.
Really! The customer
asked for these attributes in the early stages of the program definition, demands only come later when you are in deep s**t having accepted the order when you haven't produced what you promised, product, cost and timing combined. It is usually a result of a disconnect between the sales department and those who have to come through with the goods.
Concurrent engineering was another requirement imposed by the customer.
The absolute prerequisite to run a successful Concurrent Engineering program is that you not only must have a properly staffed organization setup that differs from traditional program organizations, but one where the designated participants know more about what they are developing than they don't know. For L-M, the scales tipped to more of what they didn't know having the most weight.
Really? And you know this how? Your years and years of experience running a concurrent engineering program? And LtGen Bogdan can complain all he wants about Lockheed's approach to concurrent engineering, but what actual experience is that based on? None you say? Concurrent engineering is inherently risky.
Too bad you stopped fly fast jets so soon, those like the F/A-18E/F. Had you stayed longer you would have flown on two engines that were designed developed and produced using the risky process of Concurrent Engineering. The time for design and procurement cycles were reduced by 20-60% in the development phase and cycle times for key components were reduced from 22 week to 3 weeks by the design and manufacturing team members working together from the onset of the program. I might add that the CF6-80C and the GE90 engine programs used the same Concurrent Engineering process. Yes there was some risks, but more was known what wasn't known for each of these programs. Since my engineering experience goes all the way back to the TF-30 and SST engines, while you were busy learning how to and then flying fast jets, I was busy making things to help you to fly (safely).
Developing AND concurrently integrating all sorts of other new technology is very risky.
Only if you
don't know as much as you need to know, then Concurrent Engineering is not right for you.
Now that you are on the other side of the fence at Boeing (assuming that is true), I wish you well. I had some really good engineering experiences with both MD on the military side and Boeing on the commercial side helping them with items we were doing that they could do to reduce costs, lead times and improve performance. Should you ever get into a position dealing with the US DoD, as the famous C&W song goes "Know when to hold them and know when to fold them", don't try to BS them as L-M did on the F-35 program…
