SS
I don't think it's grammar-pedantry to point out what words mean.
As for LM: I have had the great good fortune to talk face-to-face with the people who made the U-2, SR-71, F-117 and F-16 happen. None of them still works for Lockheed Martin, which no longer resembles (IMHO) the Lockheed or General Dynamics of the past.
I'm sure that there are talented and diligent people there, but I don't think that there's anyone who would (for example) point-blank refuse to brief a swing-wing F-X (F-15 competitor) to Wright-Pat, on the grounds that it made no sense whatsoever.
You question my attitude to LM (and may I add that since I lost my favorite Rotring my pens are from Costco) but you seem to have exactly the same attitude to Dassault and Eurofighter. I've provided chapter, verse and citations for LM claims that I see as over-the-top...
Concorde comparison: I think that there may be a parallel between the Pentagon's pursuit of an all-stealth force, 1985-2015, and the SST history. It was expensive, it resulted in compromised aircraft (small and range-limited) and in the end it wasn't right for the operational requirements that emerged (quieter airplanes and sybaritic B-class cabins). I'll admit that is a big, squishy idea and that many people will disagree.
The best things that came out of Concorde were some basic technology (mostly avionics), a trained workforce and (I am only half joking) an Airbus program that was founded on looking at how things were done on Concorde and doing exactly the opposite.
TSR2, MRA4 - The plug should have been pulled earlier in both cases, but neither could or should have continued. MRA4 (as has been detailed here) was unsound. TSR2 was at best on the same trajectory as F-111 (the RAF Historical Society review is excellent). The difference was that the US could afford to build 250+ deficient F-111As and F-111Ds, and still build Es and Fs.