Following the article on Monday 6 July in
The Australian, “
Pilots Told to Switch Off $6m Radar System” (see below), the spin doctors at Airservices have come up with the most extraordinary claims. In effect they are saying that the multilateration system was never designed to work below 6,000 feet - see
HERE. I reckon if you’d believe that you’d believe anything!
I love it! They also say,
Procedural separation of aircraft is a procedure used at a number of airports around the country where traffic volumes permit, including many large regional airports.
Yes, but they don’t mention that every other capital city airport has a proper radar control service right to the runway. Why would you bother to spend $6 million on a radar service for Tasmania and not actually provide a separation service below 6,000 feet?
The most likely truthful explanation is that the contract did not go as planned. I can imagine the low morale associated with working for such an organisation. They simply fib their way out by stating the ridiculous.
The contractor for the multilateration system, upon its completion, stated what they thought was the truth. These are their words from their website (see
Tasmania Airspace Now Controlled With High Accuracy Wide Area Multilateration | Brolair International ) :
Enroute surveillance of air traffic across the island and down to the surface at Hobart and Launceston Airports
Watch this space … we’ll try and get the truth to come out. But it may be difficult.
Surely someone must know what is going on? Presumably they did not put enough multilateration stations in or could it be that they located them in the wrong areas?
To spend $6 million of the industry’s money and not even get a service below 6,000 feet is totally ridiculous.
What do others think?
Here is the article from Monday’s newspaper:
Tasmanian pilots told to switch off $6m radar system
A multi-million-dollar, state-of-the-art navigation system installed by Airservices Australia in Tasmania still leaves pilots at the mercy of pre-radar, 1950s-era, air traffic control procedures which are considered inefficient and not as safe.
Aviation industry figures say the failure to use the system for radar-style surveillance approaches to Launceston and Hobart makes it a waste of money and makes those airports virtually unique among big Australian cities.
Some sources said Airservices had intended to use the system for surveillance approaches but was knocked back by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority because it was not reliable enough, while others said Airservices did not want to take on the air-traffic controllers union, which would resist such a move. Airservices has denied both these suggestions.
The Tasmania Wide Area Multilateration system, or TASWAM, was introduced after a near midair collision at Launceston between a Virgin Blue airliner and a light aircraft years ago.
After the near miss, CASA insisted on the installation of transportable radar at Launceston, while Airservices worked towards a long-term solution.
In 2006, Airservices announced TASWAM, which uses triangulation from radio transmitter ground stations to pinpoint aircraft through their transponders, and the system was made operational five years ago.
But rather than guide aircraft all the way to the runway, pilots are told as they descend through 7000 feet that they are no longer covered by radar-standard surveillance. Instead, they are required to switch to the local towers in Launceston and Hobart for procedural approaches.
Whereas under “radar certif*ied surveillance approaches” aircraft are directed by air traffic controllers using precise positioning on radar screens, procedural approaches require the controllers to rely on the pilots informing them of their positions.
Procedural separation is far less efficient because controllers have to allow much greater distance between aircraft, often about 20 nautical miles, rather than five miles under radar surveillance separation.
The president of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots, airline captain David Booth, said procedural separation meant it was more likely aircraft would exper*ience air-traffic delays in Tasmania.
While he insisted the procedural standard was entirely safe and equipment on modern airliners provided excellent and reliab*le situational awareness, he said “a radar environment would probably give you a higher level of safety”.
Captain Booth, who has been flying to Tasmania for more than a decade, said he understood TASWAM had been commissioned to introduce radar-*style air-traffic control in Tasmania, but “it never worked well enough for CASA to sign it off”.
A CASA spokesman said the authority had approved Air*services to use TASWAM above 7000 feet, but “the surveillance coverage below this altitude does not meet the coverage requirements to allow air-traffic control to apply surveillance procedures”.
When TASWAM was announced, media releases from Airservices and the manufacturers of the system, Sensis Corporation — which is now part of the Swedish Saab group — gave a clear impression that surveillance approaches were the objective, talking about “accurate coverage of 150m or better from the ground level”.
“Sensis WAM’s precise surveillance of aircraft enables air traffic controllers to implement five nautical miles of aircraft separation for safer, more efficient use of the airspace in a region that was previously controlled with procedural separation standards,” a Sensis press release said.
Asked the separation standard in Tasmania below 7000 feet, an Airservices spokesman said “in most cases, 20 nautical miles”.
However, Airservices said it had never intended to use TASWAM, which cost $6 million, for surveillance approaches, saying it had achieved the goal of “improved situational awareness for controllers”.
Saab spokesman Sebastian Carlsson declined to comment.