The problem today is guys are taught only one way of doing things. They are not taught how the a/c & its systems works in depth. Often they are not encouraged to use discretion when operating the AFDS and use its capabilities. The SOP says a 'Go Around is accomplished by .............' The first of which is always TOGA. The SOP has been written for a single, simple, scenario at DA/MDA. A PF should know what to do in any simple scenario: how to use the best system and mode necessary for the job in hand. I find it disappointing that guys have to ask how to use the AFDS to make a G/A when above MAA or just slightly below it.
The questioner seems to assume A/T is engaged, as have all the answers.
This lack of thought was demonstrated some years ago, B767 making a night procedural NPA to a visual finals with medium level cloud and good visibility. The F/O turned in too early on the procedural turn (no DME) and failed to configure early enough to slow down. (We did not have rigid trained monkey SOP's. It was pilot judgement going overhead the field and tear-dropping onto finals.) This was an SFO so I hinted rather than coached, but left him much to himself to allow his thoughts to choose & decide. The MAA was 2000', no radar, a clear night and no other airborne traffic. BY now, with only 2 hours fuel on board we were quite light. He disconnected the automatics when visual on finals about 5nm out and started to descend, but he was high & fast. I waited to see what he would do, and at 700-500' I suggested this was not going to work out and called a G/A. He pushed TOGA and selected full G/A power. This over powered beast of an a/c roared skywards, captured the MAA with >3000fpm and would have bust it and stuck the any loose object to the cabin ceiling if I hadn't pulled the power back. We repositioned for a 2nd attempt and this time he gave himself more space, configured earlier and we landed in an normal fashion.
In the aftermath discussion I asked why he had applied full G/A power? The reply was "because you called Go Around." There was only one method to do it. No consideration about doing what was needed to handle the scenario. Black & White, one rule for all occasions, but it caused a consequential problem. The look of surprise when we analysed the event and he discovered that there was more than one way to do it and that as PF you could use common sense to choose. If the MAA was 5000 and required a full clean up, 1 way; if the mAA was 2000' and we were going to keep mid flaps then another way.
Sadly, most airlines I've flown with since have the 'one rule suits all' philosophy. They did not like the guys & gals to think too much. Speaking to friends who fly with 2 different national carriers, they describe they are encouraged to use airmanship to do what is necessary. Every event is different. Sometimes, on a CAVOK day, and ATC asks for a G/A due blocked runway, and you are at 1000', the first thing they might do is pause, no rush, look at PNF and say "ready for G/A" advance the power mid-level and call relevant flaps and climb away in relaxed fashion. Oh that we all had the ability to choose.
One airline had a manual flight G/A policy until Flaps UP. I was at a non radar airfield, low cloud, heavy turbulence, heavy rain, circling in force. At MDA (high) we were not visual and it was only 700' to MAA. Called G/A, FlapsXX gear up and engaged A/P. The look from 2 year 1500hr PNF was astonishment. "Can we do that?" "We just did and don't you think it was a safer idea, especially as the Thunderstorm didn't let us fly the standard missed approach and we needed to ask ATC for different routing and MAA altitude?" Having the automatics in made it all relaxed. It's the way the a/c is designed to be used when necessary. But the SOP says you have to wait. IMHO this would have caused consequential problems; so best to avoid them by using the a/c systems in an acceptable manner. Shock horror, but lesson passed on.