Originally Posted by
76fan
.... and please don't shout .... I hope that wasn't a new technique taught at CFS when TC went through. I do pity his poor RN students though.
In the main, flight students are not discussing this accident, seasoned pilots are. That may be the root of TC's frustration with elements of the discussion.
SS points out that "we are not quite sure" problem with the altitude at initiation of the event. Sid expressed my interest in this tragic accident perfectly, which is: I want to understand.
The point I agree with TC on (strongly) is the surprise and reaction time problem between a real loss of both engines, unexpected, and the practice exercises one does to prepare for "the real thing." I too have, a few decades ago, run crews through sim sessions and occasionally toss in an unscripted power loss or malfunction. It really shows the crews where they are "on" and where they are vulnerable. Valuable training, and a use of the sim that can't really be done in the aircraft.
The case of the forced landing cited above, in the snow, reads like the desired "gradual degradation" mode. The pilot saw that things were beginning to go wrong, and thus he was already mentally taking care of what to do if they kept going wrong. When they did, he was on top of it.
The big unknown for this accident is "how rapidly did things go wrong in sequence" and thus place the pilot (David) in a game of "catch up to the aircraft" over an urban area at night with precious seconds ticking away.