Engines,
Thanks for all your thoughts they are interesting observations. I do have some observations that differ from yours as you might expect. It seems to me, no matter how you cut it, the JPO is totally responsible for the management of a program, complex or not. It is their job to assure that the program is carried out in such a way that the key parameters are met, which among other things includes program timing and milestones, program costs, reliability and
risk analysis/risk abatement, just to name a few.
The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).
So, just looking at this from an engine perspective, that idea is awful. The key component of any new project, once identified, is the question: "What can possibly go wrong?" So if you are depending on your sole source supplier to provide you with a risk analysis/risk abatement program, you have hired the Fox. Do you think for a moment UTC/P&W would share real risk data when they advertised low risk in the first place?
This is where I blame the US DoD leadership all the way to the SoD. IMO, this is why the engine program as well as the entire program is in such disarray, decisions as you point out here. It has been my understanding that the SoD, at the time, promoted these changes to save money and that included the elimination of funding for the F136 engine even although directed by Congress to continue on. There is history that defines how stupid this decision was:
From Congressional Research Service
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Historians trace the Air Force’s interest in pursuing an alternate engine for the F-16 to Air Force frustrations in the 1970s with Pratt and Whitney’s management of the effort to develop the F100, and to Air Force concerns about using a single type of sole-sourced engine to power its entire fighter fleet of F-15s and F-16s. The use of annual competitions for procuring engines for an aircraft procurement program was unprecedented and controversial. Proponents believe it produced better engines, on better terms, for less money than would purchasing from a single company facing no competition. Other observers believed it “unjustifiably jeopardized combat effectiveness and pilot survivability.” Most of the studies have concluded that contractor responsiveness—not dollar savings—was the primary benefit of the competition. Testimony presented at a 1984 hearing suggested that requiring General Electric and Pratt and Whitney to compete for annual production and O&S work generated benefits for DOD in areas such as better contract terms and conditions, better warranties to ensure engine quality, consistency, and long-term stability of support.160 A 1987 assessment stated that after competition was introduced, the incumbent (Pratt and Whitney) offered “engine improvements to the Air Force earlier than the Air Force had been led to expect without the competition.”
So lets move to today's situation. When General Bogdan took over the F-35 program he was very loud and clear with both LM and P&W as to the lousy job they were both doing and that he expected more for both. He also identified, for the first time, the shortcomings of the aircraft and engine and lowered expectations. Then came the engine failure and fire that basically destroyed one aircraft. Bogdan was emphatic that
P&W would get at the root cause of this failure and P&W would cover whatever cost incurred required to fix the problem. In other words, not at taxpayer expense. So here are the results of that:
From Defense News:
Pentagon, Pratt Cut Deal for F-35 Engines, Modifications
The newly identified root cause? “Prolonged rubbing into the material in the stator,” the JPO said in a statement. That “decomposed and superheated the titanium rotor, leading to excessive heating which started very small cracks in a titanium seal and then led to failure of the 3rd stage fan rotor.”
The office is working with Pratt to implement a plan to modify the fielded engines while also putting through a long term solution for newer copies of its F135 engine.
The cost of the modifications are included in the contract for LRIP 7, which was also awarded Tuesday. That award was for $592 million. When added to a previously awarded sustainment contract from last December, the total cost for LRIP 7 comes in at $943 million in funding for Pratt.
The lot covers 36 engines, as well as associated management and support. Pratt submitted its initial offering for LRIP 7 and 8 together; the announcement notes a contract for LRIP 8 is expected in the “near future.”
So my take on General Bogdan is that he has talked the walk very well, but walked the talk very poorly.
BTW, the Congressional delegation from Connecticut says:
(Source: John B Larson) Blumenthal, Murphy, Larson, Courtney, DeLauro, Esty Issue Joint Statement on $592 Million Pratt & Whitney Contract for F135 Engines HARTFORD -U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), U.S. Senator Chris Murphy...
"We applaud Pratt & Whitney for its continued commitment to driving down the cost of the F135 engine,"
Now if you are an engine person, you and I both know that rubbing of a titanium blisk seal is not the root cause of the F135 engine problem but a symptom of a more significant problem which must be resolved if the flight envelope is to be maintained. We will see how long, how many ($$$s) it will take and what the performance hit will be. It won't be pretty…
TD