Turbine, JF, Glad, Others,
Firstly, my apologies for the gap in posting - I've been on foreign travel, catching up on all the holidays I never got to do when I was working. The other reason is that I've been reading the two reports (DODIG and GAO) that have sparked off the recent thread activity.
Usual disclaimer - I've been off the F-35 programme for some time, and I have no special access, so this reply is based on 'best guess' and informed opinion'.
A common thread across the two reports is the engine, so I'll address those issues.
DODIG Report:
In the early days of the JSF project, the aim was to go for a more streamlined and less intrusive way of procuring military kit in the USA. The old compliance systems tied up literally thousands of staff reading papers, checking lists, writing specs that couldn't be complied with, and getting contractors to spend millions on mountains of paper trying to comply with a huge list of requirements.
The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).
This report reads to me as if the JPO have fallen squarely between two stools, and by trying this 'lighter' approach have not held P&W down to the letter of the contract, or in some cases, haven't reflected the full extent of DoD regulations into the contract. Some of the omissions the report picks up are frankly surprising, especially the lack of a dedicated Quality Plan for the F135 engine. That's a basic building block of any contact I was involved in, but I have seen recent MOD DE&S contracts with US companies opt for the 'generic' type of plan that is reported here.
I do note that this report is not about the engine's quality 'per se', but about the systems being used to control and manage the quality and any risks in achieving the required quality. The only 'effect' I could find in the report was the failure by P&W workers to wear goggles.
But I don't want to even try to sugar coat this. The findings, including of out of calibration test kit and FOD in the final assembly area are bad news. These are basic issues that have to be put right. This isn't a good report, and I'd expect some JPO staff to carry the can for it.
GAO Report:
The GAO has, for some time, majored on two key issues' with the JSF/F-35 programme. The first was insufficient technical maturity (or excessive technical risk) at the start of the programme. The second was excessive 'concurrency' (overlap) between the development phase and the production phase.
My view is that GAO have good points here - LM certainly underestimated the technical risk associated with designing a powered lift aircraft, especially the risks associated with designing a low weight but rugged airframe with lots of big holes in it. They also underestimated the risks involved in stuffing an LO aircraft with a huge number of mission critical systems. That said, I would offer the thought that designers have to take risks to achieve the improvements in performance demanded by customers.
On concurrency, GAO have a valid point, but a degree of concurrency is inevitable in any real combat aircraft programme to meet real world schedules. LM's problem (and the JPO's) was that they thought that the X-35 programme had delivered a design that could be easily translated into a production aircraft. It hadn't, and that mistake led LM to assume very optimistic dates for 'design freeze'. They missed those dates by a mile, and ended up with a massive list of changes to incorporate into LRIP aircraft.
Turbine's list is interesting - it looks quite old, some items on there date from around 2003. The thing I would offer is that downstream change is inevitable on any aircraft project, and lots of it. It's engineer s**t, and needs to be handled in an organised and methodical (i.e. boring) way. LM didn't do that, and ended up playing 'catch up' late in the game. As I've often posted, life isn't perfect, designs aren't perfect, and stuff happens. What matters is how well you handle the stuff.
Engine Issues:
The headline is the 'poor reliability' of the F135. Again, here I feel that the F-35 are being held hostage to over optimistic promises. The reliability figures are certainly well below the forecast curve, but quite honestly I've seen far worse figures for far less advanced engines at a similar state of entry to service. (RR gem and RB199 spring easily to mind).
That doesn't make the F135 any better, but i do think it puts it in some context. These engines are fiendishly hard to design and make. They are at the very cutting edge of technology, and being worked hard. Again, stuff will happen. On the F135, stuff is happening. My guess is that they will work the issues and get the figures into line. But it will be hard. (By the way, I have NO idea why the STOVL engine is performing better than the CTOL).
Having looked again at the graph in the GAO report, and done some searching on the Net, I'm not sure that there is a strong link between declared F135 reliability and the cancellation of the F136. The F136 was effectively stopped in July 2011, and fully stopped in Dec 11. The GAO graph shows a jump in reliability in early 12, followed by a major fall in late 12.
Second engine cancellation - my own views, informed by some first hand knowledge while in DC. The F136 was under strong attack from 2005 onwards, mainly by Congress, who were looking for cost savings. The DoD were divided on the issue - the technocrats who ran engine tech programmes reckoned the F135 was great, while USAF and USN programme managers who were scarred by the 1970s PW100 saga wanted the second engine.
The Uk Govt and MoD were, in my view, sadly deficient in not pushing for the F136 to continue. The US Government expected them to push, and were amazed when they didn't. Again my view - F136 would have given business to RR, helped export more F-35s, and provide an engine with more thrust and a much better compressor.
Result was an open target for Congress, no push from DoD or JPO, and help from the other nation involved, UK, arrived far too late to make a difference. The rest is history.
Hope this lot helps a little, best regards as ever to those running the numbers again, and again , and again, and again, and again, and.....
Engines