Hi DC9, after 30+ years as an IFALPA rep, you certainly won't find me arguing against the implementation of ICAO SARPS !
My thought was though it will be long while before the final report comes out, it's odds-on that the enquiry into this (Halifax) will find reason to question the crew's decision making, whatever the other contributory causes - they almost always do. And the individual crew members are already facing several class action lawsuits.
The report into the AF accident made a lot of play about decision making in changing conditions:
On the other hand, a decision to continue and land when the visible cues are very faint at best at DH is a stressful one for a pilot. Should visual cues then diminish or disappear after the decision to land has been made, the first feeling or impression on the part of pilots is one of incomprehension, followed by a period of inaction, where they wonder what just happened,
and where they wish that things will get back to normal soon. This lack of reaction while waiting for the runway environment to re-appear is because the brain becomes task saturated at that very moment, unless the pilot has been trained to react instinctively and immediately to the threat. Naturally, the correct action must be an immediate go-around. The Board believes that, if more training could be done in this respect, the rate of these types of accidents would decrease.
So I wondered if anything changed in AC's training after that (or anyone else's, come to that). I suspect not much.