Objective
We inspected the F-35 engine (F135) program’s quality management system for conformity to contractually required AS9100C, “Quality Management System,” statutory and regulatory requirements, DoD policies, and internal quality processes and procedures. F135 engines are procured by the Department of Defense from Pratt & Whitney for the F-35 Lightening II program.
Findings
A. Additional program management oversight is required by the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), as evidenced by the 61 nonconformities (violations of AS9100C, regulatory requirements and DoD policies) that we documented during our inspection.
B. The F-35 critical safety item (CSI) program did not meet DoD CSI requirements, including requirements for parts identification, critical characteristic identification, part determination methodology, and supplier identification.
C. (FUOU) The F-35 JPO did not establish F135 program quality goals and objectives that were mutually agreed upon by Pratt & Whitney for current contracts. Additionally, Pratt & Whitney metrics did not show improvement in quality assurance, process capability, and [REDACTED]
D. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney proactively identified, elevated, tracked, and managed F135 program risks, in accordance with the F135 risk management plan.
E. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney’s supplier selection criteria and management of underperforming suppliers were sufficient.
F. The F-35 JPO did not ensure that Pratt & Whitney demonstrated adequate software quality management practices. Pratt & Whitney had an outdated software development plan, requirements traceability issues, and a software quality assurance organization that did not perform required functions.
ouch
All going well then. Just ask Gen. Bogdan, he'll tell you.
Can someone say 'General Electric'?