GF4RCE:
thats a big assumption to make considering you don't have the relevant data nor the aware of the dynamics within the cockpit at the time.....
Based on my experience in the airline industry and within the multicrew cockpit environment, I can well ascertain the dynamics.
Flying, at this level, is procedural and rule based, hence, the reasons for the plethora of theory examinations, countless hours of procedure training in simulators including company SOPs, the countless regulatory publications including but not limited to State AIPs, Aviation Acts, Aviation Orders and the most dominant document - the Company's OPS SPEC.
no occurrence or accident is a SINGULARITY but rather layers of failures that surpass common crm and decision making processes...
Please read my previous posts within the thread. The accident started back in LTBA - at Dispatch.
i dont think fuel was as issue from what i know, that flight had 22t of tankering fuel plus alternateS..
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s) must have met conditions equal or above the next highest category of approach... e.g ILS CAT1 at dest then the alternate wx min for the alternates should at least NPA minima.... ..
This only makes this accident totally avoidable and unnecessary.
With 22 tonnes of "tankering full", due most likely to commercial reasons (far too expensive at VNKT), the PIC had the options to divert (even back to LTBA if so desired) or to hold for 3+ hours (with MDF still intact) until the fog burned off.
The standard Company SOP statement regarding the responsibilities of the PIC has a legal finality
the issue is more deep seeded than the crew disregarding
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s)
One may infer that you work for THY.....?
In the end, if walks like a duck, quacks like a duck and looks like a duck - it's a duck!