AF447 and Automation, also in the BEA report you will find mention of the C Chord, static position error and an incorrect down vsi accompanied by an incorrect loss of indicated altitude. All of these are additional factors helping to lead to disorientation. In that same report you will find reference to other operators experiencing the same undesired aircraft state with varying outcomes. For some it was a nonevent while it was a bit of a ride for others. It was not that long ago that jets were routinely hand flown to cruise, allowed to get on speed and in trim, and then given over to the unsophisticated, by today's standard, autopilot.
Then there is the issue of the Flight Director bars. How many times have you yourself or someone you are flying with followed the flight director bars when they should have been disregarded. You know, the mode was not appropriate. Manage the automation, and workload. We return to a discussion that was started about 20 years ago. Use the appropriate level of automation.
Now look at the BEA final report page 96. Then correlate your understanding of that graph with the timelines elsewhere that show the AOA. Pitch commanded up when it should have been down ...
A strong and well practiced sense of energy management would have helped these pilots to maintain pitch and power while sorting out the issue, wherever and however that sense was attained. And to have guided them in the right direction as to which elements of the automation were erroneous.
If the automation never took a vacation or lied there would be no concern about automation dependency.