FO Cokebottle:
In short, the PIC may have had all these cards in their hand but due to the decision making processes, for what ever reason, discarded them one-by-one until there was nil other alternative/option other than to land in such weather conditions by conducting a Low Visibility Operation (LVO) autoland onto a runway that, as aterpster has pointed out, was NOTAM'ed with a displaced threshold, which is a lesser issue than that of the runway, itself, was not to the equipment/facility standard required to conduct such a landing in LVO conditions.
thats a big assumption to make considering you don't have the relevant data nor the aware of the dynamics within the cockpit at the time.....
the issue is more deep seeded than the crew disregarding ( if indeed that is remotely relevant in this case) all the items one by one as you simply put it.. may i suggests reading on james reasons work before you try to pin the issue at the sharp end. indeed there might be many valuable lessons in the form of "CRM and application of SOP, Rules and Procedures and how they are incorporated into the decision making process of pilots" but remember no occurrence or accident is a SINGULARITY but rather layers of failures that surpass common crm and decision making processes...
JammedStab:
Not sure I understand. I heard they held for quite a while due to poor weather. Did they hold for such a long time that they could no longer get to their alternate? Was their alternate New Delhi which has CAT III?
i dont think fuel was as issue from what i know, that flight had 22t of tankering fuel plus alternateS..
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s) must have met conditions equal or above the next highest category of approach... e.g ILS CAT1 at dest then the alternate wx min for the alternates should at least NPA minima.... ..