aterpster:
then again the illusions created by the airplane being in a vertical position in space at DA to land on a runway 400 feet closer could have been a contributing factor.
"illusion" implies you can see the object concerned - in this case the runway. In this case the aircraft descended into fog (see previous posted video clip). I will not even discuss "slant visibility" and its effect on "forward visibility" as this is basic knowledge.
ATC watcher:
Exactly - welcome to the real world - not the 1st world.
JammedStab:
Help prevent a repeat accident by telling us what happened. By not doing so, you could be one of the holes in the Swiss cheese if it happens again
By ignoring just about every basic rule/regulation regarding the IFR, including but not limited to:
1. Flight Planning (Dispatch)
a. Alternate requirements
b. Fuel Requirements
i. holding fuel
ii. minimum fuel [including minimum divert fuel]
2. Holding and Instrument Approach to Land Procedures
a. Meteorological minima for the approach
3. Aerodrome Meteorological Minima
a. Landing Minima
b. Low visibility operations/procedures (application of such procedures)
c. Application of Aerodrome Meteorological Minima
i. Pilot responsibilities
ii. ATC assessment
In short, the PIC may have had all these cards in their hand but due to the decision making processes, for what ever reason, discarded them one-by-one until there was nil other alternative/option other than to land in such weather conditions by conducting a Low Visibility Operation (LVO) autoland onto a runway that, as aterpster has pointed out, was NOTAM'ed with a displaced threshold, which is a lesser issue than that of the runway, itself, was not to the equipment/facility standard required to conduct such a landing in LVO conditions.
The belief that an RNAV/RNP, RNAV/GNSS approach makes you bullet proof is a fantasy that has invaded the profession. As discussions with 7478ti have disclosed, there is so much more that has to be in place to conduct these approaches to a CATII, CATIIIa/b minima/standard both in the airborne equipment and training of aircrew to the ground based facilities and training of ATC.
As an example compare the VOR and RNAV/GNSS approach minima to RWY 35 at OEMA.
This "accident" will no doubt be used, in the future, as a valuable lesson in CRM and application of SOP, Rules and Procedures and how they are incorporated into the decision making process of pilots.