Many accidents with this profile, over 5+ decades
There have been many accidents following this erroneous "visual reference" profile over the past 5 decades. In fact, it is important to note that even FAR25.1309 [see the preamble] was largely instituted due to the two famous fatal accidents very similar to this one, that took place at KBFD, both CV580s, at the same airport, both winter nights, two weeks apart. The first was AL736 on Christmas eve, Dec 24, '68 and the second AL737 Jan 6, '69. These two accidents were key events in the direct chain that led to RNP's creation, assuring that every SIAP has a safe vertical and lateral path defined all the way to the TDZ, all the time,... as well as a safe path back out from the TDZ, in the event of some factor like "loss of visual reference".
As to the MDA being used as a DA, Theo VanDeV at KLM clearly showed during AWO HWG deliberations over two decades, ago why this policy to set MDA=DA is safe and appropriate, without needing any 50' additives, but some states and authorities have nonetheless been slow to take advantage of the increased safety of using VNAV paths with MDA=DA, in lieu of "dive and drive", by still assessing a completely unnecessary 50' additive penalty.