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Old 11th Apr 2015, 12:15
  #218 (permalink)  
FO Cokebottle
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: South East Asia
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My reply to Tom Imrich...now known as 7478ti

1. Wikipedia was used as it provided the simplest and shortest definition, in layman's terms, to explain the aspects of what was being discussed. Remember KISS.

2. GLS/GBAS - Yes point conceded if the airport has the suitable equipment to provide the GBAS portion of the marriage. However, the procedure approach flown was a RNAV(RNP) not a GLS/GBAS

Your specific reference AC120-28D also states:
AC 120-28D
07/13/99
Page
48
1. Operations Specification.

Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with, and properly
able to apply, operations specifications applicable to Category III landing or low visibility takeoff.

2. Normal and Non-normal Procedures.

Pilots should be familiar with appropriate normal and
non-normal procedures including crew duties, monitoring assignments, transfer of control during normal operations using a "monitored approach," appropriate automatic or crew initiated call-outs to be used, proper use of standard instrument approach procedures, special instrument approach procedures, applicable minima for normal configurations or for alternate or failure configurations and reversion to higher minima in the event of failures.

3. Weather and RVR.

Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with weather associated
with Category III and proper application of runway visual range, including its use and limitations, the determination of controlling RVR and advisory RVR, required RVR equipment, appropriate light settings for correct RVR readouts and proper determination of RVR values reported at foreign facilities.

4. Use of DA(H) or Alert Height.

Pilots should be familiar with the proper application of Decision Height or Alert Height, as applicable, including proper use and setting of radar altimeter bugs, use of the inner marker where authorized or required due to irregular underlying terrain and appropriate altimeter setting procedures for the barometric altimeter consistent with the operators practice of using either
QNH or QFE.

5. Use of Visual Reference.

Pilots should be familiar with the availability and limitations of visual
reference encountered for taxi, takeoff, and approach. Approach visual reference limitation information should at least address aircraft geometry limitations on visual reference, actions to take with loss or partial loss of visual reference, risks of inappropriate use of visual reference, and necessary visual references for continuation after Decision Height, if a Decision Height is applicable. Issues listed in section 6.2.7 above for continuation or discontinuation of an approach in deteriorating weather conditions should be comprehensively addressed.

Pilots should be familiar with procedures for an unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than the minimum visibility specified for the procedure during an approach, flare or roll out including the proper
response to a loss of visual reference or a reduction of visual reference below the specified values when using a Decision Height and prior to the time that the aircraft touches down.

The operator should provide some means of demonstrating the expected minimum visual references that occur on approach when the weather is at acceptable minimum conditions, and the expected sequence of visual queues
during an approach in which the visibility is at or above the specified landing minimums. This may be done using simulation, video presentation of simulated landings or actual landings, slides or pictures showing expected visual references, computer based reproductions of expected visual references, or other means acceptable to the FAA
In this case the RNAV(RNP) VIS MINIMA is 900M for CAT C Aircraft. I have been led to believe that the Company MINIMA for this approach is 1500M.

Hence my point regarding the decision making processes in this "actual" accident.

I understand the debate for more automation vs pilot experience requirements - However, I stand on the latter side of the arguement. I have witnessed the actions of those who fly by the ADFS when it stops doing what they wanted it to do - KSFO RWY 28 QUIET BRIDGE as a specific and perfect example.

In the end, I am just a line driver that follows Company Procedures (including being familiar with Jeppesen VOL 1) to allow me to keep working and earn a pay cheque. Not doing so will get you terminated. Anything more out on the line is akin to going down a "Rabbit Hole".
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