chopper 2004, that's a pretty chilling video to watch. I commend the pilot for being open and upfront about the whole episode. One thing that struck me was his reference to an apparent unreliable attitude indicator and his decision to cage the instrument in flight.
It reminded me of this
excellent article by Elan Head in Vertical Magazine about another highly experienced pilot who, after an inadvertent entry into IMC, experiences a mismatch between his vestibular senses and his attitude indicator an proceeds to disable his one and only lifeline.
After eighteen years of flying I have several thousand hours of IFR time; several hundred hours of actual IMC time and probably at least fifty hours of hand flying in IMC. Even so I would estimate my ability to fly an AS350 in IMC conditions at a few minutes tops. Back when I actually did fly EMS in an AS350 I probably would not have lasted for more than a few seconds in IMC.
The thing is, I was instrument rated and -in theory- fully qualified to fly in IMC conditions. Why do I think I would I have only lasted for a few seconds? Because I had zero actual IMC experience and because I had no stability augmentation; no EGPWS or TAWS, no weather radar and only a tiny ADI to look at. Faced with inadvertent IMC I would have likely reached over and caged the ADI too, unable to process the overload of conflicting sights and sensations.
This is, by and large, the current state of the EMS industry: otherwise competent pilots who are not qualified to fly in IMC conditions are being sent out in aircraft that are not properly instrument equipped. It should not be a surprise that this leads to incidents and accidents.