The report is sobering. It struck me that this was the first effort at loading the larger vehicles. What appears to be the root cause, however, is that one of the smaller vehicles broke loose as the initiator of this tragic loss of control on take off. (Or I misunderstood the report)
This leaves me scratching my head.
A size/class of vehicle that they had previously moved seems to have been the trigger to the larger problem of cargo shift.
The other bit that had me scratching my head: the report states that the flight deck crew didn't check the loadout in Bagram after a report of a failed restraining strap.
I need to read the report again to digest it. The swiss cheese holes did indeed line up.
@ JetJockey:
The report pinpoints a critical shortcoming in task analysis / mission analysis / and professional risk assessment regarding the new cargo: the Cougar vehicles. As you say, in some respects the crew were set up. As to an FAA cert: I am not sure a cert would have made a difference. The company had a formal process, and a formal position description, for loadmaster. (You may feel it wasn't rigorous enough ...) One could argue that this formal position and training means they exceeded regulatory requirement, as the company had identified a need to train/educate (at some level) their cargo crews.
Whether it is insufficient in the general scheme of their operation I won't try to guess.
Whether it prepared a crew to take on a new, novel, tougher task looks to be answered in the negative.