Tu.144
I agree with most of what you've said. The need in a modern turboprop with a V1 failure is one of monitoring, not throwing switches and levers.
As for workload when a failure to autofeather occurs, or when a fire and failure occur simultaneously... Can anyone actually tell me the last time a modern turboprop had this occur? Engine failures between V1 and MSA are very, very rare these days - couple this with a simultaneous fire or failure to autofeather... I simply can't remember this having happened to any airline turboprop airframe type, the world over, for the last twenty years. As for monitoring torque push on the live and auto feather status, let the PNF worry about it. Just fly the OEI attitude and look at the VSI. Either it's climbing like it should (autofeather and torque push have occurred) or it isn't climbing like it should and something is drastically wrong. The correct attitude and the VSI will tell you. No need for slick hands or fancy callouts.
Yes, autofeather failure or simultaneous fire and failure needs to be trained for, but let's keep it all in perspective. It's a terribly, terribly unlikely thing to occur at takeoff.
If it's flying and climbing, it's flying and climbing. Get the thing safely accelerated and cleaned up, burn the good engine to its OEI time limit before reducing to MCP, get it to MSA, accelerate some more... And then, with the AP on if type allows, two pilots can concentrate on carefully pulling the dead engine into feather/fuel cutoff.
I don't for a second imply that this is definitely what has happened in this case. However, regardless of the cause of this accident, the way turboprop crews are trained on this has really been bugging me for a long time.